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Pouitics AND Pusiic DeBT
Tue DomINION, THE BANKS AND ALBERTA’S SOCIAL CREDIT
The Bank of Canada’s first governor, Graham Ford Towers, 1935. Photograph by Yousef Karsh. National Archives of Canada,
Yousef Karsh collection, Acc. No. 1987~054, Item 21261.
POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
THE DoMINION, THE BANKS AND
ALBERTA’S SOCIAL CREDIT
Robert L. Ascah
The University of Alberta Press
Published by
The Unuversity of Alberta Press Athabasca Hall Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E8
Copyright © Robert L. Ascah 1999 ISBN 0-88864-306-3
Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data
Ascah, Robert L (Robert Laurcnce), 1954— Pohiacs and public debt
Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN 0-88864-306-3
1 Debts, Public——Canada 2 Canada—kconomic conditions—1918-1945 3. Canada—-Econami condi- tions—1945-1971 © 4 Canada—Poliuics and government—1930-1935 * 5 Canada—-Poliucs and government—— 1935-1957 ° 6 Alberra—Economic conditions— 1905-1945." I Title
HJ8513.A82 1998 336 3°6'0971 C98-910779-5
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The University of Alberta Press gratcfully acknowledges the support received for its publishing program from The Canada Council for the Arts In addition, we also gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program tor our publishing
activities
# Canada Tae Canapa Cauncn | be Conseit ors Ares di a
FOR THE ARTS | DU CANADA sence t9s7 | peptrs 1957
CONTENTS
Charts and Tables Acknowledgements Foreword by Paul Boothe Preface
1 Public Debt and Debt Management 2 Capital Markets and the Players
3 Political Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements, 1930~1939
4 The Alberta Default and Its Impact on the Dominion’s Credit
5 Broadening the Ownership of the Debt and Bank Resistance, 1935-1939
6 Wartime: Conscription of Capital If Necessary, But Not Necessarily Conscription, 1940-1945
7 Attempts to Keep Faith with Bondholders, 1945-1952 8 Politics, Public Debt and Debt Management
Appendices Appendix A Synopsis of Major Domestic Borrowing, 1930-1952
Appendix B- — Synopsis of Dominion Loans Issued Abroad, 1930-1950
Appendix © Credit Rating of the Dominion of Canada and Selected Provincial Governments: Moody’ Investors Service, 1930 through to 1953
Appendix D Government of Canada Bond Yields, 1930-1939 Appendix E Government of Canada Bond Yields, 1940-1945 Appendix F Government of Canada Bond Yields, 1946-1952
Notes Bibliography Index
U7
146
148
149
150 151
1§2
153 185
199
CHARTS AND TABLES
Chart 1.1
Table 1.1
Chart 1.2 Chart 1.3 Chart 1.4 Chart 2.1 Chart 3.1
Table 3.1
Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Chart 4.1 Chart 4.2 Table 4.1 Chart 6.1
Chart 7.1
Distribution of debt by currency of issue: 1900-1952
Dominion of Canada funded direct and guaranteed debt at March 31, 1930
Direct funded debt and average interest rate: 1930-1952 Term to maturity of funded debt at March 31, 1930 Distribution of public debt: 1938-1950
Sale of Canadian bonds by issuer: 1928-1952
GDP and unemployment rate: 1930-1939
Provincial government debt, January 1, 1938 by currency of issue
Provincial governments—Gross Debt Charges
May 1931 conversion loan
Farm receipts and provincial income—Alberta Alberta’s public finances, 1926-1937
Province of Alberta public debt as at March 31, 1936 Victory loan campaigns
Canadian/U.S. exchange rate, 1939-1951
107
125
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
WiTHouT THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF Proressor Paut BOOTHE OF THE Department of Economics at the University of Alberta my study on politics, public debt and debt management in Canada would not have been developed into this book. His research on the early fiscal history of the Province of Alberta brought him to read much of what follows.
I have fond memories of my research time at both The Bank of Nova Scotia Archives in Toronto and the Bank of Canada Archives in Ottawa. Jane Nokes at ScotiaBank and Jane Witty of “The Bank” were always courteous and supportive in locating material and reviewing the appropriate references and text of the quotations used. In revising my dissertation for publication, I have also had the assistance of Corrine Millar of the Bank of Canada Archives and Matt Szybalski of the Bank of Nova Scotia Archives.
During my time in Ottawa, I had the great pleasure to meet the late Ralph McKibben who served as deputy governor of the Bank of Canada. Mr. McKibben was an invaluable source of information and perspective in giving context to the period under consideration. The late George Watts, also a former senior officer with the Bank of Canada, was extremely helpful in discussing some of the files routed out of the Public Archives (now the National Archives of Canada) and the Bank of Canada. Alec Keith, who was the Bank of Canada’s senior representative in Edmonton during the time | embarked on my research, was generous in arranging interviews and explaining the nuances of central bank’s cash management to an uninitiated political scientist. I would also like to thank Nigil Gunn of Bell Gouinlock whose sense of humour and remarkable recall of events in the 1930s gave this fascinating period in Canada’s financial history excitement and life.
I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of the anonymous reviewers whose suggestions on organization have been invaluable in clarifying the intent and themes of the book. In addition the professional editorial and production support of Mary Mahoney-Robson at the University of Alberta Press was critical in the final stages of this project.
vill
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The support of the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme is gratefully acknowledged especially the encouragement of Dr. Michael Carley, che program's former director.
The Institute for Public Economics at the University of Alberta also provided additional funding and resources toward the publication of this study. The Institute’s mission is to, through research and teaching, create and disseminate knowledge of the public sector and its influence on the economy and society.
It is somewhat difficult to understand why writing a book based on a completed dissertation would be more difficult and time consuming than completing the doctoral requirement. My usual approach to these things is to throw as much energy into the project and then, hopefully, to glide it toa “perfect” landing. As my wife, Linda, kept reminding me, perfectibilicy and writing books are not compatible. Consistent with that wisdom, the loss of my full text in the computer was one of the several setbacks that forcibly revealed this truth. Linda’s willingness to give me time to plug away at the book, while she looked after our daughter Rachel, was critical to the completion of this book and is deeply appreciated.
FoREWORD
In 1992, I attended a lecture by Professor John McCallum at the C.D. Howe Institute. McCallum was talking about the economic consequences of Quebec separation and the audience included a number of Canada’s captains of industry. In the question period following the lecture, the discussion touched on the issue of government debt default and I was astonished to hear a leading member of Canada’s financial community boldly assert that no province had ever defaulted on its debt.
Two thoughts immediately sprang to mind. The first was the famous quotation by Spanish philosopher George Santayana: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” The second was the pressing need for someone to set down on paper the story of government debt in Canada, and, in particular, the amazing events surrounding the default of the Government of Alberta under Premier Aberhart.
Robert Ascah’s book fills that need admirably. Through a tremendous effort of scholarship, the author takes us beyond the facts and figures into the paneled board rooms to meet Bill Aberhart, R.B. Bennett, Graham Towers and Clifford Clark. One can almost imagine the smell of cigar smoke and the taste of after-dinner port as bankers denounce the cancer of Social Credit and describe how it imperils the very foundations of western civilization, not to mention the dividends of their shareholders. In the hours before the default, the clock can be heard ticking and one can almost feel the nervous tension as Aberhart and his officials wait for the federal reprieve that never comes.
This is a story that cries out to be told, and Robert Ascah has done us a great service in bringing alive this little-known, but critical chapter of our history. His account of this period helps us to see how the economics and politics of government debt shaped the development of our country and brought us to where we are today. Throughout the 1990s, issues of government debt—both federal and provincial—have dominated Canada’s political agenda. Reading this book gives us a new perspective with which to understand
ForEwoRD
the events of the last decade, as well as some valuable lessons about the interface between politics and finance. With these lessons in mind, perhaps we will be able to avoid the fate of those who forget their history. I hope so.
Pau BooTHE
PREFACE
My INTEREST IN THE STUDY OF PUBLIC FINANCE BEGAN IN THE MID-1970S while I was a junior auditor with the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. It was during this period that the beginning of the public debt build-up began. Between 1945 and 1975, federal public debt had grown negligibly, and, as a percentage of gross domestic product, the public debt was a mere blip on the radar scene of Canadian public finance. This would soon change and with it the character of the debate on public debt. But this debate did not really commence for another decade. What tweaked my intellectual interest in the subject was the near religious views of economists that the public debt was nor an issue. In fact, in those days there seemed to be a view that public debts hardly mattered at all.
When I began my research on politics, public debt and debt management in the early 1980s, I found a general indifference or bemusement about the subject of public debt and a lack of questioning as to the implications of growing debt on the political system. The issue was, and remains today, largely a nonissue for political scientists, with certain exceptions.’ With the stratospheric interest rates witnessed in the early 1980s and stratospheric defi- cits arising from the “Volcker induced” recession, seminars on government deficits and debts became fashionable. During the early to mid 1980s academic opinion tended to be divided whereas the opinion of the financial press and most business economists was almost universal in condemning the continuing failure of the federal government to rein in their deficits.’
By the early 1990s, the issue of public debts and deficits was no longer a matter for government technicians and investment bankers, the subject was now on the top of every government's agenda in this country.
By 1994, Canadian taxpayers and Canadian and foreign financial communities had finally discovered the magnitude and policy implications of the federal and provincial governments’ deficits and accumulated debts. At chat time, one frequently heard utterances from “think tanks,” provincial politicians and officials that federal and provincial deficits were reaching
xi
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PREFACE
“crisis” proportions.’ In March, 1993 Premier Clyde Wells of Newfoundland spoke of the need for managing provincial finances “in a manner that will not jeopardize our credit rating.”* That April the International Monetary Fund warned that Canadian governments deficits will push Canada’s external debts “to levels that could have increasingly negative effects on market conditions.” In the fall of 1993, it was also reported that federal officials were quietly canvassing the country’s financial community about contingency plans for provinces in the event that they could no longer refinance their maturing debt.
In December 1993, comments attributed to a senior official of Standard & Poor's suggested that “tough measures” by the provinces were needed to avoid a downgrading.’ In February 1995, a few weeks before the federal government’s budget was to be introduced, Moody’s Investors Services announced that it had put the Government of Canada’s debt on review for a possible downgrade, a downgrade which was confirmed that April.* During that 1994-95 period, similar reports, which would have been unthinkable a decade before, discussed openly stories about foreign investment counsel recom- mending to their well-heeled clients reductions in their “exposure” to Canada.
During the period from 1982 to May 1998, credit rating agencies (Moody's, Standard & Poor’s, Canadian Bond Rating Service, and Dominion Bond Rating Service) downgraded the provinces’ ratings 65 times with upgrades occurring 14 times. From 1993 until 1998, the Government of Canada had been downgraded at least once by major agencies and twice in the case of Moody's. At present, there are no provincial credits that enjoy the coveted triple “A” rating and the federal government's foreign debt is not rated “AAA” by any major Canadian and U.S. rating agencies. Clearly government policy-makers are coming under increasing pressure from the media and financial community to do something about the rising public debt.
The emergence of deficit reduction and debt repayment in the mid to late 1990s illustrates the impact of capital markets on government policies. The resistance of finance capital to the financing of ever-expanding public debt by raising the cost of borrowing to governments accounts in significant measure for the emergence of the “neo-conservative,” market-based fiscal and economic policies.
Most recently, a “consensus” has emerged amongst Canada’s economists to the effect that the “debt crisis” is over and a “virtuous cycle” of debt repayment is about to occur at the federal level. This optimism is in my view is premature for several reasons. Firstly, only recently has the debt as a percentage of Gross
PREFACE
Domestic Product (GDP) begun to fall. Secondly, in 1998, Canada is experiencing its sixth year of economic expansion—a recession is likely to occur in the next two or three years that will negatively affect expected government surpluses. Thirdly, economists often fail to account for the impact of political expediency that tends to limit a government's opportunities to significantly reduce debt. Related to this is the absence of any meaningful statutory limitations federally that require balanced budgets and debt repayment. It is this author's contention that when the next recession hits there will be another crisis over public debt and interest rates that will bring to the fore the tension berween democratic control over the banking system and finance capital’s influence upon democratically elected governments.’
The deficit and debt reduction that has been achieved over the past three years at the federal and provincial levels (with the arguable exception of British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec) illustrate the influence of finance capital over fiscal and economic policy-making. The federal cutbacks to provincial transfer payments and provincial cutbacks to municipalities, schools, hospitals and social assistance recipients, as well as the ideological drive to lower taxes, are all a testament to the serious consequences of high levels of indebtedness. Indeed, in Alberta, the crusade of Ralph Klein's government was very much premised on the notion that government, like a household, had to keep its deficit and debt under control or it too would go bankrupt. This fundamental issue is central to the book's exploration of the financial crisis arising from the election of the Social Credit Party in 1935.
One of the most interesting observations arising from research into Alberta's fiscal history is an astounding absence of knowledge about the 1936 default. Indeed, during my employment with the Treasury Department in the mid 1980s, when the Province began to borrow abroad, the fact of the default required disclosure and very few Treasury managers were aware of this episode. It is as if this failure to honour obligations has either been lost or selectively forgotten in Alberta's history.
Politics and Public Debt attempts, through the window of history, to examine the interaction of politics and capital markets from the perspective of the debt management function. Why should political scientists be inter- ested in public debt and debt management? This book answers that ques- tion by asking a series of questions such as “who holds the debt?” If holdings of public debt are concentrated, do these holders have influence over a government's financial and economic policy-making? While this book addresses these “political” questions, it is also hoped that this historical account will be of interest to economists, political scientists, bankers, investment dealers, credit analysts, institutional investors and historians.
xii
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PREFACE
Structure of the Study
The book is based on my Ph.D. dissertation completed at the University of Alberta in the fall of 1983 under the direction of Professor Garth Stevenson. In light of current events, the dissertation has been considerably rewritten with a focus on the critical debt management issues for the Dominion government during the 1930-1952 period. Given the significance of Canada’s debt situation today, the concluding chapter comments on some of the important lessons to be drawn from the study that may be relevant for contemporary policy-makers and capital markets participants.
This book asks “do public debts, particularly rising public debts, matter?” by examining the interaction between politics and financial markets through the debt management function. It covers two periods of acute social, political and economic turmoil, the Depression and World War II (1930-1945) and a period of relative economic and political stability, che post-war years (1946-1952).
My study begins with a definition of debt management, objectives and constraints guiding the debt manager, and a summary of the changing character of the Dominion’s debt immediately before and during the period under study. To frame the discussion of the debt management process the key figures involved in the debt management function are described in the second chapter, “Capital Markets and the Players.” In the chapters following, key issues, objectives and constraints relating to the debt management process are examined, As will be shown, each subperiod is unique insofar as the issues facing the debt manager.
The time period selected—1930 to 1952—was chosen for specific reasons. Firstly, fuller access to archival records is an essential source in comprehending the actions of the players. Secondly, this period is a time of remarkable change (depression, war and reconstruction) and one of severe financial challenges to governments. Thus, this period offers an interesting precedent as Canadian governments face significant fiscal challenges today.
Finally, any “facts required to be stated or any facts omitted that are necessary to make the statements and analysis herein not materially misleading” are those of the author's alone. For those with comments on the book, please
write me on INTERNET— rlascah@planet.eon.net.
l Pus.ic DEBT AND Desr MANAGEMENT
AccorDING TO J.M. Keynes, the “permanent relations between debtors and creditors...form the ultimate foundation of capitalism.”' Exploring the central factors that influence the prices for government bonds and deviations from this relatively stable set of “permanent relations between debtors and creditors” makes these “permanent relations” more intelligible.
To understand the nature of debt management, its legal aspects must be understood. Debts are legal obligations between a debtor and a creditor. Debts imply that a crust has been bestowed by the creditor upon the debtor, that is, the borrower will repay interest and principal in a timely fashion. Viewed in these terms, debts of the state are conceptually no different from debts of an ordinary individual. Nevertheless financial arrangements between the Dominion government as borrower and public creditors, such as banks and insurers, are more complicated due to the government power to legislate, to tax, to create legal tender, regulate banking and to expropriate property. Still, a creditor holds a promise to repay and by threatening to withhold further loans, that may influence the actions of debtors. Heavy indebtedness, the enforcement of security arrangements, and the withholding of new credit may all give creditors the opportunity to exert influence on the policies of the Dominion government.
Canada’s early economic development and its evolution from a colony to an independent Dominion depended on the provision of loans by London. Indeed, Canada’s greatest economic historian, Harold Innis regarded Confederation as a “credit instrument.”? The British North America Act, 1867, devoted considerable attention to the disposition of public debts of the former colonies.’ Tom Naylor in his colourful history of Canadian business claimed that the only thing that the Canadian colonies had in common were their debts to the Baring Brothers.‘
United Kingdom investors and institutions loaned heavily to colonial and provincial administrations and to the Dominion government and private
POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
corporations (often with a governmental guarantee) to finance canal and railroad construction. This debtor-creditor relationship was vitally important and its modalities depended largely upon Canada’s population growth, its economic development, and the export price of raw materials with which it earned foreign exchange to pay interest and retire principal.
Dest MANAGEMENT
Debt management is a complex governmental function possessing its own vocabulary, culture and community. Sound debt management depends upon an intelligent reading of capital and money market movements, an extensive network of contacts on the “street” (a street which is increasingly international in scope) and that elusive and priceless asset, “good judgment.” Debt management is a decision-making process based on policies (e.g., borrow “long” or “short”) and on judgments. Debt management includes the following functions: (1) advising the borrower (the minister of Finance) on the terms, conditions, timing and size of a new offering; (2) changing the term structure of the debt outstanding in the hands of the public by buying and selling securities on the government’s own account (e.g., as “principal”); (3) main- taining data on outstanding direct and guaranteed debt; and (4) carrying out related administrative tasks (e.g., legal documentation, fiscal and paying agency arrangements, securities registers, cancellation and destruction of securities).’ In Canada, the Bank of Canada advises the Department of Fi- nance whose minister then recommends to the governor-in-Council the terms and conditions of a new issue. It is the minister of Finance who is ultimately responsible and accountable to Parliament for the conduct of debt management.
Objectives The main objectives of debt management are:
¢ To minimize interest and borrowing costs to the issuer. To accomplish this proper pricing was critical. To pay three or four basis points more than market rates was seen as poor debt management. Selling bonds with a shorter term to maturity during periods of falling interest rates was another method to reduce costs as borrowers waited to borrow “long” as long-term rates reached a trough.
* To ensure that an issue brought to market is absorbed with a minimum of disturbance to the prices of outstanding issues traded in the secondary market.
* To broaden the market in government securities by selling to as wide a group of investors as possible and into different capital markets. A wide
Public Debt and Debt Management
placement of debt implies less fluctuations in price should any group of institutional investors be forced to, or decided to, liquidate their holdings.
To maintain a balanced spread of maturities in order to avoid an extremely heavy refinancing operation at one point in time. This goal necessitates periodic “funding” operations.
To provide flexibility in operations by not adhering in a doctrinaire way to a set formula on debt management. Flexibility can be achieved by a variety of means including improved spacing of maturities, and the use of “call” features.
Constraints
The main constraints facing debt managers include:
Form of the Debt. Call features, two or three pay bonds (optional-pay bonds), tax-exempt features, nonmarketable debt instruments which can be cashed at any time (e.g., savings bonds), are all examples of important variables that reduce, or provide, flexibility to the debt manager.
Market Conditions. Canada’s relatively underdeveloped capital market took its direction from London and New York. Hence, international developments such as key elections or defaults had a crucial influence in setting the “market tone” and thereby the course of Canadian interest rates.
Lnvestor Resistance. As one life insurance executive stated before the Porter Royal Commission on Banking and Finance: “the only way you can influence the rate of the next one is not to take this one.” Resistance by chartered banks in the early 1930s took place over the roll-over of maturing issues. The banks as a collective unit were in a particularly strong position to influence the outcome of the negotiating process.
Inflation, Bank Borrowing and Monetary Policy. This issue was crucial during and after the war. Sales of debt to the banking system (including the central bank) leading to a rapid growth in the money supply would have inflationary consequences if production did not correspondingly increase. Borrowing from the banking system could eventually lead to lower bond prices as investors’ real returns were diminished through the inflationary process. As finance capital’s [see definition below] expectations adjusted to inflation investors in Canadian dollar securities would exchange their Canadian dollar securities for other securities that investors believed would better hold their value. This decrease in the
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
demand for Canadian securities would reduce the price and hence Canadian interest rates would rise to compensate finance capital for the greater risk. This in turn added to the government's debt servicing costs.
© Political Factors. Political instability, especially at the time of elections consistently causes finance capital to delay decisions as to investing in certain securities for fear in the fall of prices. The greater the uncertainty as to a break in government policy would cause capital markets to sell off or “stay on the sidelines” until a clearer policy direction was evident. Between elections unexpected calls for changes in policy also disrupted capital markets. For instance, calls by Social Credit for more central bank financing and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation's (CCF) demands that interest rates be brought down significantly did give Dominion officials some ability to use these demands as a lever against the chartered banks. At the same time, the central bank had to be cognizant of the fact that should a widespread perception grow that the central bank was at all sympathetic to the inflationary calls of Social Credit, a crisis of confidence might arise forcing interest rates to rise.
Tue Dominion’s Pustic Desr: EvoLuTION 1900-1952
Students of Canadian political economy are familiar with Canada’s dependence upon British finance capital that purchased bonds of Canadian governments and railway syndicates to finance railroad and canal construction. The initial raison d étre for borrowing abroad was for economic development, to foster territorial expansion and consolidation through railway and canal building. Between 1896 and 1913, a huge investment boom took place in Canada with $1.4 billion invested in transportation infrastructure; between 1900 and 1910 $1 billion was invested in agriculture and $800 million in manufacturing. Reliance on London's capital markets was necessary given these huge requirements and the relatively unsophisticated nature of Canada’s bond markets prior to 1914.2 One important assist in facilitating the raising of these enormous sums was the placement, in 1900, of the Dominion of Canada on Great Britain's “trustee list.”
The Great War changed forever Canada’s reliance on the United Kingdom for finance. War financing arrangements saw the Dominion advancing funds to the United Kingdom for its purchases in Canada with Canada paying for its war expenditures incurred in Canada. By 1915, London was no longer a source of funds save for financing Canada’s overseas war effort. By 1917, Canada’s advances exceeded those from the “mother country,”? which meant,
for the first time, Canada was exporting capital to the United Kingdom.
Public Debt and Debt Management
Chart 1.1 Distribution of debt by currency of issue, 1900-1952
Percent
T T TT
1912 19201928 1933-1937, 194t- 19451949 Year
~-— Canadian dollar —— USS. dollar senerereece U.K. Sterling
Source. Canada Year Book, Public Accounts of Canada, various years (at March 31).
Distribution of Debt by Currency
During the Great War, the Canadian Government was compelled to rely on Canada’s ill-developed capital market to raise the necessary funds required for Canada’s contribution to the war effort. The Dominion’s domestically issued debt, which stood at only 0.2 percent of total debt in 1914 mush- roomed to 67 percent in 1918 reaching 81 percent in 1920. The portion of Dominion debt payable in sterling dropped from 98 percent in 1914 to 13 percent by 1920 (excluding the Canadian Northern Railway’s debt assumed in 1919), a rather astounding change (Chart 1.1).'° Thus, the Great War ne- cessitated a re-evaluation of the role of London in meeting the Dominion’s borrowing requirements.
Towards the end of the Great War, the first attempts were made at tapping funds in New York. From 1920 onwards foreign borrowing was, in the main, refunding of maturing loans although there is some evidence that during 1931, the Dominion sought to borrow in New York to protect Canada’s “gold reputation.”
During the R.B. Bennett’s primeministership (1930-1935), there does not seem to have been any concerted effort to reduce Canada’s foreign indebtedness. However, with the Bank of Canada’s establishment, the
5
POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
understanding that principal and interest denominated in foreign currencies were less controllable and therefore less desirable than domestic placements, due to foreign exchange risk, was articulated in the Bank’s third Annual Report.
Any considerable reduction of our foreign debt must, in any case, take many years, in view of the magnitude of the task. Considering only Dominion and Provincial Governments’ direct and guaranteed debt, and that of the Canadian National Railways, there is still about $1,307 millions payable abroad, and not only that, but an even larger total of debt—$1,379 millions to be exact—carries the option of payment in one or more foreign markets as well as in Canada. Our efforts should, of course, be directed first towards a reduction in such optional payment bonds. Certainly it is undesirable that any additions to chis class of indebtedness should be made from the point of view of the Canadian economy as a whole.”
The Second World War not only cut off England’s financial resources but led to the repatriation of some $300 million of Dominion and Canadian National Railway (CNR) securities held by U.K. citizens and institutions. On top of that transfer was a billion dollar contribution in the form of a gift to enable England to meet part of her foreign currency shortfall."" Canada’s role in aiding England to purchase supplies in the United States was made more difficult by the invocation of the Neutrality Act sanctions that prevented Canada from raising new funds in New York until the U.S. entered the war in December 1941 after Pearl Harbor.
The huge domestic borrowing operations combined with repatriation, left most of the debt domiciled in Canada at war's end. After 1945, new foreign borrowings were initiated by a concern for the value of the Canadian dollar, the latter day equivalent to protecting one’s “gold reputation,” and not by the Dominion's inability to borrow domestically. The small percentage rise after 1945 in foreign-pay debt is a reflection of the large retirement of domestically held debt, not the growth of foreign loans except during the 1948-1949 drawing on Eximbank’s credit facilities and the 1949 U.K. borrowing,
Quantum of Debt and Interest Rates
At March 31, 1930, a little over 10 percent of the Dominion’s direct and guaranteed debt was payable in the United Kingdom as Table 1.1 illustrates. This table also shows interest on the debt (direct and guaranteed) ranged from 2.5 percent to 7.0 percent. Much of the debt issued during World War I
Public Debt and Debt Management
Table 1.1
Dominion of Canada Funded Direct and Guaranteed Debt March 31, 1930
Direct
Payable in Canada $1,804,977,029 Variable (4.5—-6%)
Payable in London 257,185,700 Variable (2.5-4%)
Payable in New York 165,965,900 Variable (4.5—-5.5%) Guaranteed
Railways, principal and interest 677,154,484 Variable (3.5-7%) including gold bonds
Railways, interest on] 216,207,142 y y 7 4
Other, c.g., harbors 32,335,118
Total 35153,825,369
Source Public Accounts of Canada, pp. 14-16
was tax exempt in the hands of holders. In addition, a number of guaranteed railway issues were “gold” bonds meaning that holders were entitled to receive payment in gold.
Direct funded debt (i-e., excluding short-term treasury bills or notes) rose quickly from $2.2 billion in March 1930 to $3 billion in March 1935 as a result of the Depression. With modest economic recovery and fiscal restraint direct funded debt stood at $3.4 billion by March 1939.
From 1940 to 1945, funded debt rose nearly fourfold to $15.7 billion in order to finance the war effort. Thereafter the debt declined modestly to $15.2 billion by March 1950. At the same time, while the debt rose exponentially, the average interest rate declined to its lowest level in this century (Chart 1.2). Asa result, interest payments on the debt as a percentage of Gross National Expenditure (GNE) only rose from 3.2 percent to 4 percent between 1939 and 1945 although the funded debt rose fourfold during the war. After the war, large surpluses resulting from an unexpected postwar boom allowed the Dominion to retire some of the outstanding deb.
Average interest rates on the Dominion’s direct funded debt began a slow secular descent commencing in 1934 (Chart 1.2). This decline reflected
7
8
POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
Chart 1.2 Direct funded debt and average interest rate, 1930-1952
20000
OOO,
10000
5000
Direct Funded Debt Average Interest Rate
° T T T —T ° 1932-1935 1938 1941 1944 1947 = 1950
Year —— Drurect Debt
sesteneeeee Average Rate
Source Canada Year Book, Public Accounts of Canada, various years
the secular decline in worldwide interest rates as a response by central banks to the chronic unemployment and unused industrial capacity experienced. For Dominion debt managers, the refunding of large maturities beginning in 1934 allowed interest cost to decline despite continuing large government deficits. The average interest rate continued to drift lower throughout the Depression providing welcome relief to governments seeking to balance their budgets as well as to cope with swelling relief costs.
With the war effort underway, rates dropped sharply as governments recognized the importance of financing the war at rates significantly lower than during the Great War. Thus rates drifted to levels not seen since in this century. This deliberate policy was emphasized in 1944 when rates were lowered again in anticipation of higher unemployment associated with reconstruction. Dominion policy-makers were taking no chances of a return to prewar unemployment levels.
Term to Maturity of the Debt
Another important characteristic of the debt at this time was the large volume of debt maturing between 1933 and 1937 (Chart 1.3).'* This had important implications for debt management in the first half of the 1930s.
Public Debt and Debt Management
Chart 1.3 Term to maturity of funded debt at March 31, 1930
600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000
$thousands (Canadian)
200,000
100,000
1937 1939 1946-50 1955+ Calendar Year
1935
1931 1933
Source Duseribution of Debt
Distribution of Debt
Before the Second World War commenced 30 percent of the Dominion’s debt was held by nonresidents (as distinct from currency of issue), 20 percent by Canada’s chartered banks, ten percent by insurers, five percent by the Bank of Canada and the remainder held with the general public (Chart 1.4). By 1946, this changed dramatically with nonresidents holding only six percent, the central bank 11 percent, chartered banks with 19 percent, insurers 11 percent and the general public 45 percent (including Canada Savings Bonds (CSB)). This development ran parallel to the Dominion’s policy of tapping the domestic market for funds and broadening the distribution of the public debt.
The key trends through this period were the relative stability of the holdings of the banking system (including the central bank) and the insur- ance sector. After the war, the government's holdings increased reflecting their large fiscal surpluses that were employed to soak up sales by the general public of Victory bonds. The key change however was the decline in nonresident holdings that were made up by the rise of holdings by the general public and the central bank.
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10 POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
Chart 1.4 Distribution of public debt, 1938-1950
Breakdown
1940 19421944 1950 Years EJ General Public WB Chartered Banks Wi insurers (1 Government HZ] Nonresidents BA Central Bank
Source: Proceedings, Royal Commission on Banking and Finance, Vol 24, Ottawa. 1962, p #2486
In setting the context for examining the interplay of Canadian politics and debt management, the key themes that reoccur throughout are: (1) who holds the debt (the suppliers of capital (e.g., domestic, foreign, banks, the general public), the structure of the debt (e.g., term to maturity) and the financing requirements of the Dominion.
An examination of the evolution of the Dominion’s public debt structure shows that it was the external shock of the United Kingdom's inability to export capital and the Dominion’s needs for funds that dramatically changed the character of Canada’s public debt by 1918. By closing off its capital markets to the world, the United Kingdom assisted in the development of Canada’s capital markets. The large Victory war loan issues formed the basis of a nascent government bond market and led to the growth of the securities industry. For the very first time, the Dominion Government had a direct interest in the level of domestic interest rates as the pre-eminent borrower. Previously, interest rates set in the City of London affected the Dominion's
Public Debt and Debt Management
timing in its borrowings but over which it had no influence. Another important consequence of domesticating the public debt was the distribution of the debt-holders and the timing of maturities. As will be shown in the following chapters, both the distribution of the debt and its maturity structure had significant implications for the Dominion’s politics and debt management.
Il
2 CaprraL MARKETS AND THE PLAYERS
IT Is NOT FROM THE BENEVOLENCE OF THE BUTCHER, the brewer, or the baker chat we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.
Adam Smith'
Capita, MARKETS
In Financing of Economic Activity in Canada, William C. Hood defined the capital market “as the set of contacts between buyers and sellers who effect exchanges involving non-monetary financial assets. Considering that all exchanges are effected ‘in markets,’ we shall say that exchanges involving non-monetary assets take place ‘in the capital market’.”?
In Canada the capital and money markets are contiguous as there are no legal impediments segregating these financial markets. A key subset of the capital market are equity or “stock exchanges” where shares, representing ownership interests in companies are traded. Unlike stock exchanges where the visitor can watch transactions consummated at the various “trading posts” on the exchange’s floor, capital markets are not located in one central place. Instead debt instruments, representing rights to fixed periodic payments, are traded in an “over-the-counter” or “between-dealer” market. Thus the capital market consists of a system of telephone and telex interconnections between the “bond desks” of the central bank, the chartered banks and investment dealers. Those telephone connections were used by traders to determine the availability, price and denominations of specific bonds. After making inquiries on “the street,” a bond trader will then make a bid (purchase) or offering (sale) “firm.” Importantly, as Adam Smith states, the behaviour of individual actors in the capital markets tend to be predictable, in the sense that they act out of necessity, and expect to make gains from their transactions.
POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
The origins of Canada’s capital market may be traced to the emergence of brokers (market intermediaries) in Montreal and Toronto in the 1840s. In 1863 a Board of Brokers was formed in Montreal. However, the main impe- tus for a domestic capital market came during World War I. The heavy war- time financial requirements of the Dominion government, which had previously done virtually all of its borrowing on the London market, necessitated the intensive mobilization of domestic savings.’
Money MarKETs
The money market is a structured set of financial relationships becween buyers and sellers of debt instruments with a term to maturity of less than three years. More specifically:
the money market embraces the various arrangements by which (1) most non-equity fixed income securities maturing within three years are issued, traded and redeemed, (2) short-term funds are borrowed and lent on the security of these obligations on an impersonal basis.4
Money markets are a crucial component for a developed banking system be- cause it provides accommodation for banks who need to borrow money immediately and usually for a short time. Access to funds on a same day or next-day basis allows banks to meet large commercial borrowers’ needs whose demands could be unpredictable and sometimes large. Interest rates deter- mined in the money markets also determined short-term borrowing rates as banks price their loan rates above their borrowing costs on the money market, in order to earn a spread or profit.
The initial impetus for a sensitive, broadly based, money market came with the creation of the Bank of Canada in 1935. Prior to the establishment of the Bank of Canada, the chartered banks’ money market activities were confined to New York's call loan marker. The establishment of an efficient money market was essential from the perspective of the central bank because it meant a more rigorous and optimal employment of capital, and the setting of interest rates with more precision. The absence of an active money market in the 1930s was one of the criticisms that the Canadian Bankers’ Association (CBA) made in opposing a central bank.’ Professor Sayers states:
The growing doubt that eventually checked the multiplication of central banks was, however, not the basic questioning of the theory but rather reflection upon the experience of some of the infants. In one country after another open-market operations were just a dream;
Capital Markets and the Players
because there was no market in which to operate. The member banks were powerful institutions; many of them free to draw upon their own offices in the world’s leading financial centres and never needed to go near the central bank, whose rediscount rate remained completely inoperative, published in the pious hope that someone would notice what it was.®
In reviewing postwar monetary policy before a House of Commons Committee, the Bank of Canada’s first governor, Graham Towers remarked:
A broad and responsive market in Government of Canada securi- ties and the existence of the machinery which makes such a market possible helps to develop a better market for other securities and to channel funds where they are needed for the development of the country.”
To paraphrase Towers, capital markets bring savers and borrowers together and, secondly, establish a mechanism for, in effect, the pricing of credit. From a debt management perspective, the absence ofa fully functioning money market, including players outside the banking system, limited the Dominion’s flexibility in choosing the timing of long-term issues. The banks’ dominance of the short-term, immature, Canadian money market, posed serious challenges to the debt manager.
Before the introduction of a formal money market in 1953 the principal instrument for trading, the treasury bill, was held primarily by the banking system. At the end of 1952 only $30 million of $450 million in outstanding bills was held outside the banking system. During the period under study, trading in treasury bills was confined to trades between the central bank and chartered banks. This method of trading allowed the chartered banks to hide their liquidity desires from their competitors. The Bank’s entry into purchase and resale agreements with the largest investment dealers in 1953 enabled the latter to take into inventory (a “long position”) large holdings of government bills.* Shortly after these arrangements were instituted che chartered banks began to make day-to-day loans to dealers under which securities held under purchase and resale agreements were pledged as collateral.
Three other terms frequendy used are “primary distribution,” “after-market” and the “secondary market.” A primary distribution occurs when an issuer of a security (e.g., government, corporation) sells new securities to the public. The after-market is the trading in those securities between third parties (i-e., not the issuer) after the issue is priced but before the securities are delivered to the buyer.’ Finally the secondary market is that portion of the capital markets that engages in the trade of securities that have previously been distributed.
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FINANCE CapiTAL
In the first comprehensive study of public debt in the English language American Henry Adams noted there was a specific class interest associated with public borrowing.’® Referring to the situation in France during the Napoleonic Wars, he notes that the borrower (the state) and the lenders (the banks) “were separate only as legal personages." State indebtedness then becomes a political instrument.” This bond holding class is not the group of hypothetical young orphans and older widows, an argument often used to justify public debts as a sort of charitable undertaking. Instead, Adams found the bond holding class was relatively small and geographically concentrated in New York and New England. Adams argued that while
we may not say public debts bear with them a distinct and independent social tendency, it is yet true that they exert a social influence in rendering permanent such class relations as spring from disparity of
possessions, and that they introduce conflicting interests between citizens.”
Professor Donald MacGregor, a University of Toronto economics professor, also posited the view of distinct and conflicting economic interests when examining the relations between the class of creditors and debtors."
Finance capital is defined broadly here to include (1) debt and equity securities traded in the capital markets; (2) the issuers of such securities; (3) the set of institutions (e.g., the central bank, banks, dealers, institutional investors, credit rating agencies, stock exchanges) and relations among these institutions that hold or trade such securities; (4) that segment of the legal community that defends the contractual rights represented by security documentation and includes the judiciary, which represents and adjudicates between security holders and security issuers; and (5) the assumptions and values shared by issuers and the holders of securities about sanctity of market forces in determining the value of securities. A fundamental tenet in che dynamic between issuers and purchasers of securities is the desire of issuers to pay as low a rate of interest as possible and for purchasers to receive as high an interest rate for the perceived risks of default, a lowered credit rating or inflation.
International finance capital is distinguished from finance capital in that it includes a selected subset of finance capital. These players include the central banks of industrialized countries, the departments of finance of these countries, the Bank of International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the major stock exchanges in the capital exporting countries (e.g.,
Capital Markets and the Players
United Kingdom and United States), securities regulators in these portfolio exporting centres, and the largest financial institutions in the industrialized countries whose operations are international in nature and depend upon the stability of and interdependence of capital markets. The objectives shared by these players include: (1) a stable international financial system (e.g., banks); (2) the enforceability of contracts; and (3) the increased mobility of finance capital, or conversely, the elimination of barriers to the import and export of finance capital.
DoMINION GOVERNMENT: LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES Department of Finance
Under subhead 91(4) of the British North American Act, 1867, (BNA) Parliament is authorized to borrow “Money on the Public Credit.” Subhead 91(1A) makes Parliament responsible for the “Public Debt.” This Act of Westminster also granted the Dominion Parliament explicit and exclusive authority with respect to the chartering of banks and savings banks, currency and coinage, interest and legal tender. In short, the BNA accorded the federal Parliament pre-eminence in the banking sector while the capital markets fell under the jurisdiction of the provinces.”
The Exchequer and Audit Act® and its successor Act, the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act, 1931," deal directly with the debt management function. The 1931 Act fell under the administration of the minister of Finance who was directly accountable to Parliament for the debt management function. Section 6 authorized the governor-in-Council (federal Cabinet) to appoint a fiscal agent to negotiate loans on the Dominion’s behalf, to pay interest on the public debt, to manage sinking funds and to perform other duties normally associated with the fiscal agency function. The Act permitted the Cabinet, subject to the terms of the enabling Loan Act, to issue a variety of securi- ties—debentures, stock, “terminable annuities,” exchequer bills or bonds at rates not exceeding six percent per annum. The interest ceiling stipulation accords with provisions of the Jnterest Actand Bank Act that set limits on the rate of interest to be legally charged on loans. Section 7(a) authorized payment of interest from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, the Dominion Government's bank account. Section 13 permitted the Cabinet to change the form of the funded debt so long as the principal and annual interest thereon remained the same or were reduced. This allowed refunding at lower rates without recourse to Parliament.
The Act also contained a provision authorizing the Cabinet to borrow sums for periods not exceeding six months at rates of interest not to exceed
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seven percent. The amount so raised could not exceed the deficiencies in the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The Cabinet was required to present the details of the borrowing to Parliament within 15 days of the opening of the new session.
The borrowing procedure under this statutory framework begins with passage of a Loan Act authorizing a maximum sum to be borrowed. After negotiations between the government's fiscal agent and a banking syndicate or group of primary distributors was completed, a recommendation to the Cabinet by the Finance minister was drawn up. This Order-in-Council specified the Loan Act under which funds were to be borrowed and the terms, condi- tions and amount of the loan. Usually the price was not entered until che last moment as “breaks” in the market could jeopardize the marketing of the issue, leaving dealers holding large amounts of unsold bonds.
Bank of Canada
The creation of a central bank in Canada was a controversial political issue. Prime Minister Bennett was initially cool to the idea, but because he was frustrated in getting the private chartered banks to increase credit, he came to appreciate its political and economic merits. In meeting with the banks’ general managers in October 1932, Bennett indicated he had circulated a memorandum prepared by J.A. McLeod, general manager of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, to his Cabinet colleagues, that proposed that a commit- tee of financial and banking experts be appointed to control the volume of credit.” However, the failure of the banks to extend credit, coupled with the appointment of W. Clifford Clark as deputy minister of Finance, set the stage for a central bank.” On July 31, 1933, Bennett announced the creation of a Royal Commission on Banking and Currency, chaired by Scottish jurist, Lord Macmillan, who would study, among other things, the need for and structure for a central bank.
Predictably, the commission recommended the establishment of a central bank, but there were several political issues that, in effect, assisted Liberal opposition leader Mackenzie King in the 1935 election. Firstly, Bennett decided to establish a central bank that was privately owned. King framed his attack against the government by positing a potential conflict berween the directors of a privately owned bank and the sponsor government.
In the world of finance, the money power as it is termed, is of course the all-important factor that many people believe is greater than the power of the government itself. What I am anxious to be perfectly sure of is that the government of the day, in parting with
Capital Markets and the Players
some of the ownership of the money power to a privately owned and controlled institution which will be allied to all of the banks of the country and through them to all the financial interests of the country, is not bringing about a situation in which at some critical time should a question arise as between the financial interests in a large way, the two might clash, and the government find itself powerless, at least until parliament should be called together, to deal with the situation. In the meantime, in such a case, the financial interests may have had their way in furthering their interests, albeit their action might be against the public interest.°°
Further King manipulated the widespread phobia of the Bank of England in certain quarters to gain voter support. During final reading of the Bank of Canada Bill, King claimed: “the present legislation establishing the Bank of Canada, is a definite step in the establishment of an imperial policy of finance, under which the financial destiny of Canada is placed under per- sons independent of parliament, who can maintain, through the Bank of England and other central banks of empire nations, a definite and positive control of the empire, currency, credit and trade.””
With this backdrop, the search for the Bank’s first governor began. Given the strong nationalism, that individual must be a Canadian, who was knowledgeable about banking, economics and international trade. The individual selected, Graham Ford Towers, turned out to be an exceptional choice. Only 37 years old when he was appointed, Towers was born in Montreal of “Scotch and U.E.L. stock”* and educated at St. Andrew's College in Toronto and at McGill University. After returning from the First World War, Towers joined the Royal Bank of Canada and quickly rose through its ranks to become chief inspector in 1929 and assistant general manager in 1931. His salary, $30,000, higher than the prime minister's, drew some criticism, but otherwise his appointment was universally endorsed.” Towers was known for his cool cerebral nature but closer confidants referred to his wit, compas- sion and storytelling ability.* Towers was appointed in September 1934 and set off to travel around the globe to study the operations of other central banks. Interestingly, the Bank’s first deputy governor, J.A.C. Osborne, was a citizen of the United Kingdom.
On March 10, 1935 the Bank of Canada commenced business taking over the role of fiscal agent and functioning in this capacity without remuneration. Section 23 of the Bank of Canada Act** named the central bank as “manager of the public debt.” Before 1935 the Government dealt directly with a banking syndicate put together by the Bank of Montreal;
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after 1935 the Government worked through its own creation, the Bank of Canada. In 1937, the venerable investment firm Morgan Stanley was appointed lead manager and fiscal advisor to the Dominion of Canada in the United States. In London, the Bank of Montreal remained the Dominion’s “paying agent.”
Under Section 21 of the Bank of Canada Act the Bank's investment powers were specified. While the Bank’s investment powers were considerable, in practice, the Bank held and traded Dominion government securities primarily. It was the daily market contact that also enabled the Government, through the Bank, to gather for the first time relevant and independent market information directly from its own fiscal agent. As an active participant in the market, the Bank was able to provide the Government with vital market information. To paraphrase a former Finance Department official, “in order to know the market one must be actively in the market.” The Bank also provided the Dominion with vastly improved statistical information on bond prices, new issues and exchange rates.
Relations between the central bank and the dealers can sometimes be strained when the latter attempt to read trends into the Bank’s open market operations or are frustrated by the Bank's secrecy.’ In the words of the 1964 Porter Commission:
Some frustration is inevitable in any relationship between the central bank and securities markets, especially since the monetary authori- ties cannot always disclose their hand, even when they are certain of their future policy. In fact central bankers are often not exactly certain about underlying economic forces or what state of credit conditions is appropriate to them. Moreover, they must frequently use trial and error methods— known in central banking as “successive approximation”—until financial markets give them more guidance or the results of their previous policies become somewhat clearer. However, we believe that secrecy can be overdone, and the benefits of frank and full information are sometimes not fully appreciated by Canadian authorities.”
Relations with commercial banks and investment dealers also had to be handled in a delicate fashion. According to Governor Graham Towers in a 1936 briefing to a Dominion-Provincial conference:
...our position versus the commercial banks and the security market is a very special one. For example, we can never obtain opinions from any outside source when we are formulating our advice to the
Capital Markets and the Players
Government regarding new issues. Thus we never enquire the views of anyone outside the bank. A central bank must be independent and impartial, which means that on most occasions it must play a lone hand.
The relationship between the Dominion government and the central bank was also a delicate one and particularly the distinction between the locus of advice and the locus of decision-making. Again Governor Towers in a response to comments made by the Honourable C.D. Howe on the Bank's involvement in the May 1938 refunding operations.
I mentioned also that the relation of Central Bank to Government was a very special one, and that the name of the former should not be mentioned by Government as a source of advice. If it was only mentioned as the source when the Government is being criticized, the Bank would get into bad repute. But it would not be sensible for the Government to mention that they had received our advice on every occasion when they took action of a financial character. In any event, we were not the makers of policy in relation to Government finances.
MARKETING THE Pusiic Dest
Before the Bank of Canada was created, domestic issues were arranged by a banking syndicate put together and, usually, led by the Bank of Montreal. The banking syndicate would normally be composed of the major banks and investment houses who would advance funds to the Government when the securities were delivered for distribution. This function is known as underwriting. Advertising of the issue was usually the responsibility of the distribution group, although beginning with the 1931 Conversion Loan the minister of Finance took some initiative in advertising. Gradually there evolved more government sponsorship of advertising these issues, especially for the conversion of Victory Loans. The banking syndicate would then sell to a distributing or selling group—dealers, banks and brokers—the securi- ties at a price slightly above that paid to the government. Dealers, banks and brokers would then sell bonds to their clients and take some of the bonds into their own inventory. The allotment by the banking group was a matter of intense debate for dealers and brokers who, if they could not satisfy their initial orders were forced to purchase bonds in the after-market, often at a premium, while being committed to deliver these bonds to the investor at a stipulated price.
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The entrance of the Bank of Canada in 1935 changed the relationship between the Dominion as borrower and the banking syndicate. No “nego- tiations” took place although informal consultations becween the Governor, his officials and the financial community were frequent and ongoing. One of the very first tasks of the new central bank was to reorganize the pro- cedures for Dominion offerings. What evolved was the selling of a certain amount of the bonds “firm” to primary distributors on the Bank’s list of authorized distributors. Applications accepting the bonds “firm” and requests for additional bonds were to be accompanied by a 5 percent margin deposit. The final allotment was done on a pro-rata basis and was influenced by the “placing power” or distribution record of the distributors. Commissions were established by the Bank and price restrictions placed on the bonds during the primary distribution phase.
It is also important to distinguish between a public offering or public placement and a private offering or private placement. The former involves an offering through an underwriting group of bonds to the public. This procedure ensures as wide as distribution as possible. In New York, for instance, Morgan Stanley as the lead underwriter was capable of involving well over 400 insurance companies, investment banks and commercial banks in the distribution of a Dominion of Canada issue. This procedure, while requiring a considerable expenditure of marketing energies, meant the bonds would be widely held. The second procedure, the private placement, involves a smaller group of institutional investors negotiating directly with the bor- rower or agent over terms of the loan. The advantages for the borrower were: (1) the preparation of a formal prospectus" was not required; and (2) the negotiations could be finalized relatively quickly. However the lenders, in expediting the loan, usually demanded a rate of interest slightly above that prevailing in the secondary market since there was not the same ability to resell private placement issues that were not traded in the markets making price determination more difficult, and hence, more uncertain.
CHARTERED BANKS Nature of Commercial Banking
A particular banker lends among his customers his own promissory notes, to the extent, we shall suppose, of a hundred thousand pounds. As those notes serve all the purposes of money, his debtors pay him the same interest as if he had lent them so much money. This interest is the source of his gain. Though some of these notes are continually coming back upon him for payment, part of them
Capital Markets and the Players
continue to circulate for months and years together. Though he has generally in circulation, therefore, notes to the extent of several hundred thousand pounds, twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver may, frequently, be a sufficient provision for answering occasional demands. By chis operation, therefore, twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver perform all the functions which a hundred thousand could otherwise have performed.”
In a certain sense, banking may be regarded as a social function, that is, of mobilizing idle money balances and transferring the funds to individuals and businesses requiring these moneys. According to the Marxist economist Ernest Mandel:
Contrary to the industrialist and trader, the banker has in fact to play a social role directly. He is useful to the capitalist mode of production only to the extent that he can overcome the fragmen- tation of social capital into the multitude of individual properties. It is in this function of modiliser and centraliser of social capital that his whole importance to society consists. This function goes beyond the class limits of the bourgeoisie in the strict sense and embraces the centralisation of funds saved by landowners, rich and middle peasants, craftsmen, civil servants, technicians, and even skilled workers in prosperous periods.”
The business of banking involves the accepting of deposits, on which interest may be paid and the lending or investing of deposits and sharehold- ers’ equity to borrowers at a higher rate of interest. The “spread” between banks’ deposit rates or expenses and their investment earnings from security holdings and loans constitutes the main source of bank profits. Profits on foreign exchange transactions were also a source of earnings and of losses.
The Bank Act goes into minute detail specifying the type of security or collateral that banks may acquire when lending and their powers as secured creditors. Unlike life insurance and trust companies, banks primarily lend for a short term, that is less than two years. Banks therefore held shorter term government paper that could be liquidated to provide funds to “write” new loans.
Liabilities Before the creation of the Bank of Canada, Canadian banks issued their own bank notes whose circulation was limited to the shareholders’ paid-in capital
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and bank reserves. Prior to the establishment of a central bank, chartered banks paid a one percent tax per year on their outstanding note issue.
The largest liability of a chartered bank was the “notice deposit.” Thousands of individual savings deposits, earning from 2 to 3 percent (1.5 percent during the Second World War), provided banks with approximately 50 percent of their funds while demand or chequable deposits (mostly for businesses) represented almost 30 percent of a bank’s liabilities. Demand deposits were essentially drafts against a bank account payable to a third party through the banks’ cheque clearing system. The level of demand deposits was very sensitive to business conditions and the level of available credit. Notice deposits, on the other hand, remained relatively stable during the Depression. While demand deposits dropped 30 percent and note circulation 27 percent berween 1929 and 1933, notice deposits fell by a more modest 7 percent.
Assets
After 1929 a sudden contraction in commercial lending took place. This shift was caused primarily by the serious loss of faith resulting from the deflation experienced during 1930-1931. Banks shifted their investment portfolios from more lucrative, but riskier, commercial lending, to gilt-edged government securities carrying virtually no risk of default. During the 1930s, this tendency to become more risk averse quadrupled bank holdings of government paper while commercial loans were cut nearly in half. This development gave rise to the often heard charge that banks were not fulfilling their obligations to agriculture and industry. According to one student of Canadian banking though, the increase in securities holdings was “well advanced” before the Great Crash—the crash simply accelerated this trend.” Furthermore, as the banks often claimed, they had too much cash in their tills with too few credit-worthy customers who would borrow. While there is little doubt that the economics of banking gave banks an incentive to lend to industry and commerce there remained a widespread fear that losses would easily erase earnings from good loans that led to a systemic contraction of credit.”
During the Second World War, the banks’ securities holdings trebled as the Dominion’s financing requirements grew rapidly. Commercial lending, which saw a small increase early in the war, was effectively frozen as the Dominion, through the deposit certificate mechanism, monopolized the supply of credit made available through increases in bank deposits. From 1946 to 1950 total lending doubled, prompting utterances from the central bank that capital projects should be financed without short-term bank credits."
Capital Markets and the Players
In spite of this expansion of credit, it was not until 1952 that commercial lending replaced security holdings as the largest asset of the chartered banks.
Liquidity
A very important aspect of banking deals with liquidity management. Prior to 1935 this requirement was satisfied, in large measure, in New York's call loan market. Banks could access “call loans” quickly by calling their loans one day and receiving cash on the next banking day. After the Bank of Canada was established, it became for all intents and purposes, the sole “jobber” of Canada bonds and bills by quoting firm prices for standard lots (normally $25,000) on all outstanding issues. Bills could be sold to the Bank for settlement in Bank of Canada funds the very same day.” This enabled the banks to acquire ready cash resources in much the same fashion as in New York, bur without the export of funds.
Industry Structure
Chartered banks are regulated under the Bank Act, which historically was revised, according to statute, every ten years. The Act provides the legislative framework for a “branch,” as opposed to a “unit” banking system, as in the United States. A branch banking system is seen as superior to a unit banking system due to its capacity to draw upon a wide base of deposits. A wide deposit base provides essential stability to a banking system by reducing the fear that one or two major deposit withdrawals, for instance a major corporate client, could precipitate a calling of loans and a run on the bank by depositors wishing to withdraw their gold or deposits. This type of fear was particularly acute in the last century when banks were much smaller and regionally concen- trated and bank notes were redeemable in specie. These factors made a bank especially vulnerable to periodic depressions and the loss of faith of depositors and note holders.*° It is generally believed that cyclical downturns in the auto or pulp and paper industry, for example, can be offset by gains in the clothing or agricultural sectors thus obviating the problems of a narrow depositor and loan base. During the Great Depression, criticism of Canadian banks was somewhat muted because no bank failed, in contrast with the United States, which saw thousands of bank insolvencies.
In 1900, the Canadian Bankers’ Association was formally recognized in An Act to incorporate the Canadian Bankers’ Association.“ In the 1901 revisions to the Bank Act, the Association was given authority to supervise the issue and destruction of bank notes, certain powers of inspection and supervision, and to act as “curator” and, where possible, to arrange the sale of the assets to
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another bank.*? These changes sanctioned for the first time an institutional framework to resolve the recurring problems of bank insolvencies by making the industry itself responsible for seeking out ways to prevent losses to depositors, noteholders and shareholders. The amendments were associated with a wave of takeovers and mergers in the banking industry during the first two decades of the twentieth century.* In the decade preceding the 1901 revision, there were no bank mergers or takeovers with five bank failures; berween 1900 and 1910 ten banks merged while only three failed.** This merger movement made it in turn more difficult for regional banks to get off the ground. Of the 1 charters issued and banks opening for business between 1900 and 1920, three banks failed while the remainder were absorbed by larger institutions, several of which were ultimately taken over.* By 1930, all banks still operating had received their charters before 1900.
The two leading banks, the Royal Bank and the Bank of Montreal controlled nearly $2 billion in assets, or roughly 55 percent of all banking system assets. The Big Four, including the Canadian Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Nova Scotia, controlled $2.9 billion in assets, or nearly 65 percent of total banking assets in Canada. Proposed bank mergers (Royal Bank of Canada and Bank of Montreal; and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Toronto-Dominion Bank) in 1998, if they had been approved, would have resulted in the top two banks controlling approxi- mately 70 percent of total banking assets. One key implication of this structure would have been the relative ease by which government direction could have been communicated to the banking system—direction could be achieved by placing three or four phone calls to the CEOs or arranging a meeting through the auspices of the CBA.
INVESTMENT DEALERS Activities Investment dealers, known as “investment bankers” before the 1934 Bank Act revision, earn their livelihood from: (1) commissions on the sale and purchase of debt obligations (bonds, debentures) and equity capital (common and preferred shares); (2) capital gains on inventory dispositions; and (3) underwriting new stock and bond issues.** An investment dealer buys and sells securities either as an agent, for clients, or as a principal, for the firm. Underwriting, which is core function of investment dealers, involves the formation of an underwriting syndicate whose task is to bid on bonds at a set price or make an offer to an issuer to buy the bonds at a negotiated price, and undertake the distribution of the bonds to clients. The underwriting
Capttal Markets and the Players
group would require the financial assistance of a bank(s) (banking syndicate) to line up the funds to advance to the borrower or issuer after their tender was accepted, but before they sold the bonds to their clients, usually wealthy individuals or institutional investors. Prices were normally established at the last possible moment before “coming to market” as a safeguard against a sharp break in the market.*” As so much of a firm’s revenues derived from the new issuance of bonds, a sudden drop in prices could leave the dealers exposed to heavy losses. As one dealer put it “the money (is) made in underwriting (the) last million.”# When a dealer cannot sell all their bonds, they usually go into their inventory—for to unload the bonds immediately into a declining after-market would usually drive prices down further. Being left with the bonds often meant paying substantial interest charges to the bank that arranged the initial financing. During the Depression, as a result of the deterioration of provincial credit ratings and their own capital base, to minimize the risk in underwriting new bond issues, dealers formed in 1932 a central co-operative of dealers that would handle the more risky, western issues.
Profitability was affected by the volume of new issues and conversion offers, the amount of secondary trading, the spread between the prices paid for the bonds from the borrower and that received for the bonds from the investor. Dealers were constantly on the watch in their position as fiscal agent or advisor to a municipality or province to recommend the best time to come to market. It was in the interest of the dealer to encourage new borrowing or refinancing because new issues produced underwriting profits and commissions for new secondary market trading.
Another parameter affecting profitability was the allotment received under a syndicate agreement. If a dealer received fewer bonds than it was committed to sell, it would then be forced to purchase the bonds on the after-market, often at a premium to fill the order. Rising bond prices in the after-market provided an inducement for dealers to “pad” their orders to assure themselves that they would receive sufficient bonds to meet clients’ needs.
Finally, investment dealers have an important economic stake in the active trading of these bonds as they generate significant commissions primarily from the life insurance and trust industry. The dealer also acted as a jobber, by taking “a position in securities that are being traded, reduces short-term price fluctuations in that way and thereby improves the functioning of the market, an improvement based on his superior knowledge of market values.” In this function as a jobber dealers are constantly in the market buying and selling securities.
27
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
Chart 2.1 Sale of Canadian bonds by issuer, 1928-1950
S vu os a Y a 2 E 8
Lf”
1934 1937 1940 194319461949 Years
~-—— Dominion —— Municipal Provincial - - — Corporate
Source. Canada Year Book, vatious years Includes both cash and conversion sales
In the 1930s the securities industry was in very poor financial shape because of the virtual extinction of new corporate bond and stock issues.* The stock market collapse caused a severe erosion of the earnings and the capital base of most firms by reducing the value and volume of the underlying stock traded which served as the basis for calculating commissions. Chart 2.1 shows that the market for new municipal, railway and corporate issues dried up dramatically after 1930. Throughout the decade government business became the dealers’ main activity.
Dealers, unlike the banks, were more receptive to the creation of a central bank. Besides being a new player in the market, it was expected that the Bank of Canada would exert a steadying influence, smoothing price drops and rises. The Bank’s desire to see a broader and deeper market in debt
Capital Markets and the Players
instruments seemed to guarantee the dealers some prospect for a larger role in the sale and distribution of government debt, which eventually came about with the creation of a money market in the early 1950s.
Industry Structure
The structure of the investment business was, and remains quite decentralized in comparison with Canada’s concentrated banking system. The investment industry was comprised of many small firms specializing in certain types of equities or municipal, provincial or corporate bonds. The larger, more established firms such as Wood, Gundy and A.E. Ames became “integrated” with research, government finance, corporate finance and securities trading departments. Most firms were either partnerships or privately held (often in a family), where the chief executive officer had their own capital at risk and these firms therefore tended to be more aggressive in promoting underwritings, secondary market trading and seeking representation on underwriting syndicates.
Capital markets depend on financial assets to trade. Absent the effects of inflation, the more assets traded on a daily basis, the more accurate becomes the pricing of these financial assets. Government debt, as a financial asset, forms a basis or foundation of developed capital markets because these assets are essentially free of default risk; that is to say, principal and interest will be repaid. With government debt trading in significant volumes, it is then possible to create markets in other financial assets by pricing off the “risk free” rate of the national government’s bonds. Thus there developed markets for Dominion government guaranteed bonds (e.g., Canadian National Railways), provincial and municipal bonds, and corporate bonds. Each of these financial instruments were priced above Dominion bonds and traded according to their coupon rate (interest payable) and their term to maturity. The larger the volume of national government issues, the easier it would become to buy or sell these securities and this in turn allowed the capital markets to respond to the chartered banks’ demands for cash in order to fund commercial loans. Moreover, the larger the volume of trading the smaller the spread between the price a bond was offered and the spread the bond was bid. However, most importantly, the rate at which the Dominion government borrowed set the benchmark for borrowers by farmers and those purchasing homes. When the Dominion government's borrowing rate was increased through market forces so too were the rates for the general public.
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
The establishment of the Bank of Canada was an important development for Canada’s small capital market because the central bank became the largest holder of the Dominion’s debt. Also the central bank had a mandate to ensure price stability of bonds or interest rate stability while acting in the best interest of the economic life of che nation. This broader mandate meant the Bank would act to minimize economic dislocation and act to eliminate “speculative excesses” in various markets (e.g., capital, real estate, and commodities). To accomplish this objective, the Bank acted in the capital markets to adjust, over time, the prices of government bonds, and hence interest rates, to conform to its statutory goals of price stability and economic welfare.
Po.iticaAL UNCERTAINTY AND 3 New INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS,
1930-1939
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND CANADA'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM Prelude to Depression
By many indicators the 1923 to 1929 period was a prosperous era for Canadians. Exports expanded by one-third, real income grew by 25 percent, and immigration during the decade exceeded one million.' Sectors experiencing the most rapid growth were wheat and pulp and paper, buoyed by rising commodity prices. Fixed capital formation and provincial public works also expanded rapidly, especially due to hydro-electric developments and road building.
The Great War left the United States in the position of the world’s largest creditor. According to one analyst, there were three basic reasons why Americas new-found hegemony tended to destabilize the world’s financial system. Firstly, the operation of the gold standard was most successful when London was the unchallenged centre of international finance.’ After the War, with both Paris and New York competing as world financial centres, the probability of complications arising multiplied. Secondly, New York was “inexperienced” as a world trade centre and this weakness was magnified by its lack of dependence on foreign trade. Unlike England, which would immediately suffer from a drying up of world trade and credit, American financiers and legislators tended to see more benefits flowing from a policy of aucarky chan the dangers inherent in trade protectionism. The conflict between domestic and foreign economic policy was sufficient to produce Smoot-Hawley and other tariff barriers; measures which would have been suicidal for the United Kingdom's economy. And thirdly, the New York capital market was largely, alchough not exclusively, a money market.* Therefore, it was capable of disbursing only short-term credit to debtor countries when long-term assistance was required.’ Compounding these problems of international financial realignment was the intractable question of Ger- many’s reparations payments, French insistence on seeking damages and American demands for repayment in full.
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
The New York money market played a crucial role in the years immediately preceding the Great Crash when vast sums poured in from abroad to speculate on arising New York Stock Exchange. As stock prices escalated more money was demanded by investors and loaned through the short-term, “call loan” market. During 1929, the call loan rate peaked at 20 percent on March 26th and remained between 10 and 15 percent during the summer of 1929. Despite these rates, The Bank of Nova Scotia commented “the demand for funds at call was insistent, and it seemed as though the market could not secure enough at that figure.”® Yet one year after this speculative binge, call loan rates stood at two percent but demand had dried up.
During the speculative boom some Canadian bankers, to their credit, cautioned against speculative excesses. Sir John Aird of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, speaking before the Bank’s 1928 Annual Shareholders meeting, noted:
In view of the widespread prevalence of speculation it is well to remember that a rise in prices in the stock markets does not in itself increase the wealth of a country. In so far as it is due to inflation of credit it amounts to a revaluation on paper mainly made in anticipation of what the future may bring. If these anticipations are realized all goes well, but, too often, the reverse is the case. The supply of credit from the banks should be based, not on mere anticipations of future wealth, but on that which is actually in existence, and which can be utilized for the increase of bank reserves. On this basis alone can a sound expansion of bank credit take place.’
Onset of Depression: Impact on Capital Markets
Following the Great Crash in October 1929, during the wave of credit con- traction that spread through Canada between 1930 and 1935, banks liqui- dated industrial and farm loans, purchasing government bonds instead. The conservatism of bankers preserved the integrity of Canada’s financial system; a fact emphasized time and time again by government ministers and bankers alike. This desire to keep safe and sound, which was essential for maintaining a functioning financial system, led to a broader economic contraction than expected. According to Professor R. Craig Mclvor, bankers were incapable, and perhaps unwilling, to recognize the interrelationship between individual bank action and the operations of the banking system on the economy as a whole.
Political Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
The point at which the banks may be criticized is not that they were wrong in keeping safe and sound, or even that in the process of doing so they effected a highly undesirable contraction of the country’s means of payment. The ultimate responsibility for this contraction must rest not with the banks but with the government which failed to assume any responsibility for control of the total means of payment in the economy. The basic criticism of the bankers is rather that they neither understood nor were willing to learn the economic consequences of their own actions, and they consequently provided a great deal of ill-informed opposition to the subsequent formation of a central bank. It should of course be emphasized that the failure to recognize the connection between monetary contraction and the aggravation of the Canadian depression was no means confined to the bankers. It was almost universal in those early days.®
In September 1930, a sharp break in the bond market occurred as a consequence of investors’ fears that negotiations then underway between international creditors and national debtors would break down leading to default. Even before England’s flight from the gold standard, Acting Deputy Finance Minister Watson Sellar termed the New York market “disorganized” in face of fears that the U.S. savings bank system was ready to collapse.’
The collapse of commodity prices brought into question the large debts owed by staple exporting nations, Australia, Latin America and Canada. In 1931, Australia reduced all interest payments on internal public debts and some private debts by 20 percent. In March 1931, when Watson Sellar advanced proposals for a New York issue of $100,000,000 “to safeguard our gold exchange position,” he noted that Canada was suffering from a “bad reputation” on Wall Street. This bad reputation was not based on politics, but on the dreary economic news emanating from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Sellar, knowing the market's reaction to poor economic news, recommended that we “feed out short items every two or three days dealing with our financial position, and arrange with some of the press boys that they put the stuff on the wires in their own names. / would alo urge that a censor be placed on the release of the stuff by the Bureau of Statistics.” The implications for Canada’s credit rating and borrowing costs were abundantly clear—-bad news meant falling bond prices and higher interest rates.
The withholding of financial reports by the Government was the subject of a lengthy tirade by Canada’s most astute observer of public finance, University of Toronto economics professor Donald MacGregor. In an article published in The Canadian Forum in 1933, MacGregor charged:
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
It is not easy to follow the changing position of Canadian finance as long as the federal authorities continue to suppress the usual monthly figures of revenue, expenditure and debt. Suppression of financial returns began last spring, and continued until August when quarterly figures of revenues and expenses (but not of debt) for the first quarter of the fiscal year were published. Early in January the accounts for the three months ending December were released, but no figures whatever of the net debt have been published since March 31, 1932. It is a sad reflection upon the alertness and courage of whatever financial critics there are in the opposition, and in the press of the country that Ottawa has been able to suppress the usual publication of such important statistics for nearly a year without being exposed. If the weekly returns of the British exchequer were delayed as much as a fortnight, the whole Empire would know about it. But the Canadian figures are delayed six months and nothing is said.”
In March 1931, Peru suspended payments, extending its moratorium the following January. In January 1932, Mexico formally revoked its previous undertakings of July 1930 and July 1931 to maintain a new schedule of debt repayments. Similar rescheduling occurred with Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria. In May 1931, the giant Austrian bank, Kreditanstalt collapsed sending a wave of panic north through central Europe. Increasingly, pressure was placed on the United Kingdom as many institutions were preoccupied with England’s loans to Germany. This led to a heavy redemption of gold against the United Kingdom's reserves during the summer of 1931 and eventually to the decision on September 21, 1931 to abandon the gold standard." Canadian bond prices fell three and four points during the next few days as did the Canadian dollar in New York. After the British announcement, a “drastic drop in the price of U.S. securities” took place in which the yield of 90-day treasury bills rose more than 110 basis points (one basis point is one one-hundredth of one percent) between the end of September and the third week in October.” As deflation accompanied a devaluation of currencies against the U.S. dollar, many debtor countries had very little choice except to default to, primarily, American bondholders. As one investment dealer said, “this (abandonment of the gold standard) led to a distrust of everything.”
Soon afterwards pressure was applied to Canada as markets believed Canada would also be forced to abandon gold. Prime Minister Bennett vacillated for several weeks calling for Canadians to conserve gold, and during that time the dollar plunged in value against the United States dollar. When
Polttrcal Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
Chart 3.1 GDP and unemployment rate, 1930-1939
$millions
: 4 BA Pa Omer a ES : et 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Years
2 GDP
#-* Unemployment Rate
Source Dominion Bureau of Staustics, Matsonal Accounts, Income and Expenditure, 1926-1956. Canada Year Book, 1954
Canada did abandon gold on October 19, 1931, the dollar eventually dropped to a low of 80.36 cents in December 1931 recovering to around go cents the following spring. This devaluation had an immediate effect on increasing dramatically debt servicing costs for the federal government and, in particular, provincial governments (see Table 3.2).
The unsettled nature of capital markets at this time made the timing of trips to the markets exceptionally tricky. For example, in the fall of 1932 refinancing in New York had to be completed well before the Presidential elections to avoid the possibility of a decline in bond prices.’ The unsettled character of the markets was highlighted by testimony presented before the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency by the Investment Bankers Association of Canada (IBAC) in September 1933. Ward Pitfield, President of the IBAC, noted that bond dealers could no longer offer firm bids for
bonds “for fear that government policies changing overnight.”
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
Municipal defaults in the early 1930s and rumours of impending defaults also had a negative psychological impact on capital markets. As a conse- quence, there was a movement away from corporate and railway bonds into the debentures of the most credit-worthy governments, specifically che Dominion and the Province of Ontario. In October 1932 Vancouver defaulted and the City of Windsor called for a five-year halt on bond repayments. That December, Calgary refused to pay a $300,000 exchange premium on funds destined for the United States. By 1934, the total defaults of Ontario municipalities reached $84,000,000 with Quebec municipal defaults of $15,000,000.”
Amidst, and due to these financial convulsions, the Canadian economy experienced the worst downturn of this century. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by nearly one-half between 1930 and 1933. Concomitant with falling output, the official unemployment rate doubled from 10 to 20 percent in these three years. As a consequence, government revenue fell dramatically, especially in the commodity producing prairie provinces. Aggravating the problem was the fact that even though interest rates began to fall from late 1931 onwards, governments faced higher costs due to the depreciating currency and the fact that most long-term issues were not callable.
Tue Pourrica, CONTEXT AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
One of the very first indications that Bennett and his party would meet the expectations of finance capital came in the wake of Britain's abandonment of the gold standard. With the rapid fall in bond prices in September and October 1931, Bennett's cabinet quietly passed an Order-in-Council making unnecessary a write-down of security values on banks’ balance sheets."
In April 1932, as the Depression deepened, the first concerted attack against the federal government's interest rate “policy” was initiated by Progressive Member of Parliament G.G. Coote (MacLeod). Jumping on the Conservatives’ quiet passage of the Order-in-Council, Coote attacked high interest rates. Exorbitant rates were, in Coote’s opinion, harming provincial and municipal finance and ruining the national economy.” At the same time M.N. Campbell, another Progressive member, proposed lowering the maximum rate charged borrowers, thus forcing the banks in turn to “reimburse themselves by reducing the rate of interest paid on deposits.” By lowering these savings rates to one and a half or two percent, depositors would possibly place their funds instead at the disposal of the Dominion and the provincial governments by purchasing bonds.” Further attacks on the level of interest rates came from A.A. Heaps, Labour member from Winnipeg who criticized the Government for selling bonds at 5.25 percent which “meant the adding of millions upon millions of dollars to public debts in this dominion; because
37
Political Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
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38
POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
Table 3.2 Provincial Governments—Gross Debt Charges ($thousands)
Borrowers 1913 1921 1926 1930 1933
All provinces 11,931 28,287 = 48,035. —_ 58,038 += 80,084
Prince Edward Island 42 6) 114 148 214 296
Nova Scotia 456 862 1,871 2,672 3,318 3,828 New Brunswick 447 1,251 1,913 2,600 3,473 3,624 Quebec 1,214 2,997 4,886 4,336 7,223 8,890 Ontario 1,722 8,593 20,369 =~. 25,119 34,145 33,230 Manitoba 1,731 3,418 4,488 5,020 6,901 6,060 Saskatchewan 1,539 2,691 2,982 4,500 7451 10,222 Alberta 2,326 4,005 6,498 7.185 9,027 5,300 British Columbia —2,054 4,409 4,914 6,458 8,332 8,661
*Excluding unpaid interest, Province of Alberta, estimated at $3 4 million
Source Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations,
Book I11, Documentation, table 46, p 121
the moment the federal government issued bonds at 5 1/4 percent our provincial government had to pay 6 and 6 1/2 percent on money it wished to borrow.”* Thus, the apparent inability of the Dominion to control the rate of interest, which it supposedly was constitutionally entrusted to do, was highlighted by western-based politicians.
Table 3.1 illustrates the provinces’ borrowing structure by currency at January 1, 1938. This shows that all provinces, but particularly Ontario and the western provinces, were especially exposed to a decline in value of the Canadian dollar relative to the United States dollar.
Table 3.2 shows the rise in debt servicing costs facing provincial governments in the 1930s stemming in large part to the depreciation of the Canadian dollar. It was not so much the rate of interest that had weakened provincial finances but rather the debt management program adopted generally by provincial governments through the 1920s. For example the amount of public debt issued by the Dominion, Canadian National Railways and the provinces in Canada and New York rose from $343 million in 1921 to $660
Political Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
million in 1930. Similarly triple pay optional bonds rose from $187 million in 1921 to $705 million in 1930.” Between 1930 and 1933, after the Canadian dollar depreciated against the U.S. currency, gross debt charges rose by $21 million although gross debt had increased only marginally.
The Liberal Party also included in its ranks a number of monetary reformers, principally from Western Canada. Gerry McGeer, the colourful former mayor of Vancouver, was another Liberal monetary reformer who shared with members of the Social Credit party a distaste for the “debt creating system.”
We borrowed to build roads, to build railways, and to build bridges across the St. Lawrence believing that posterity was to carry the load. But, unfortunately, for this generation we have caught up with posterity, and the load which we thought posterity was going to bear we cannot carry ourselves. A debt claim system, under which men interested in interest bearing bonds control the issue of currency and credit, is not a safe system. If we are going to have progress financed and democracy maintained we must do what has been done with the post office, administer it as a public utility largely free from partisan influence.”
It was important for Mackenzie King, in opposition, to strike a balance between showing some support for debtors (since debtors outnumbered creditors by a wide margin, especially in western Canada) while at the same time not alienating finance capital, an important source of election funding. Mackenzie King and the Liberals’ sporadic attacks against the “money power,” which began early in 1933, were carefully tailored to meet the mood of an increasingly desperate population and to capitalize on Bennett's decision to create a privately owned central bank along the lines of the Bank of England.
Another quotation illustrative of the attractiveness of simplistic solutions came from Liberal Senator Lynch-Staunton of Hamilton who urged an immediate lowering of the rate of interest.
I believe that arbitrary legislation with some feature of compulsion may be necessary to bring about such a reduction. Certainly our credit will have to be much higher than it is to-day if such a campaign is to succeed. If arbitrary legislation is enacted, is it not repudiation? Is there any difference between the confiscation of principal and the confiscation of interest? That some readjustment in the bonded indebtedness of this country is essential is apparent to all. How to bring it about is the question. That there must be a readjustment
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
with che debtor class in this country if we are to have a return to prosperity is as clear as day. There can be no prosperity when our farmers are “broke”. How is this readjustment to be made? At the expense of the creditor class, of course.”
As 1934 and 1935 brought little improvement to Canada’s economy, politicians from debtor regions began to moot the idea of a general reduction in debts. The beneficiaries of deflation, besides those with a job, were indi- viduals receiving income under fixed contracts who increased their share of national income in the early years of the decade.’* Progressive Member of Parliament William Irvine was categorical in his demand for a general reduction of debts, a reduction which he imagined would benefit creditors as much as debtors “for with their power of controlling money they can make more money in a year under prosperity than they are going to lose by the cut in debts which will have to be made.” ”’ In Irvine's view, debt reduction was legitimate, necessary, and inevitable in restoring the balance between debtors and creditors in the wake of the disastrous fall of commodity prices.
One of the earliest problems that disturbed capital markets in Canada and abroad was the premier of Ontario’s revocation of hydro contracts to four privately-owned, Quebec based power companies. This move drew the ire of the prime minister who calculated the annual loss to the treasury, necessitated by the sudden withdrawal of its London conversion loan, at $700,000 for 20 years. The response of Canada’s financial community to Hepburn’s action was swift and categorical. That June, when Ontario requested bids for a new bond issue, no bids were received. “So far as ofticial records show,” reported The Monetary Times, “this is the first time that any Ontario government which called for public tenders, has failed to receive a single bid.”*? Hepburn concluded a conspiracy had taken place and he used this boycott to announce the opening of 30 branches of the Province’s new savings and loan offices fuelling wild speculation that he was working on some Social Credit scheme. Other observers believed that dealers simply did not bid because they were afraid of being left with their hands full of unmarketable Ontario bonds."
In apparent response to rising sentiments of repudiation, especially in the West, which would render new borrowing by the Dominion more difficult, the following comments of Prime Minister Bennett are noteworthy.
We have been responsible for the effort which has been made to maintain the financial integrity of Canada. I have heard jeers that we should care more for our people than for our credit, but I wonder if there is an hon. member familiar with business who does not
Political Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
know that the salvation of the people depends upon the credit which is maintained for them. How are we to secure the very things which we need in this country if we destroy our character? Our character is our credit and our credit is our character.*
In developing this theme, R.B. Bennett acknowledged that Canada’s thirst for new capital imports could only be quenched if default and repudiation were spurned. In keeping trust with foreign creditors, in preserving Canada’s credit rating, the public interest would be served.
Similar views were also expressed by Bennett's successor in the Finance portfolio, Edgar Rhodes who, when assessing the interest rate situation in 1935, opined:
It appeared that the time was fast approaching where practically all public bodies could secure the advantages of refunding outstanding issues at substantially lower interest rates, but a temporary clogging of the market and certain unfortunate, widely heralded statements have clouded the outlook for the time being. It is to be hoped that this situation is only a temporary one, but it behooves all debtors to remember that credit is a tender plant and must be carefully cultivated.”
This sentiment was endorsed a few years later by Manitoba Conservative Senator McMeans who allocated blame for the financial crisis on the respective western provincial legislatures. Noting that “no financial institution which has a board of directors in Montreal or Toronto will lend a dollar in the West,” McMeans chastised the western provinces for “the awful legislation” they are passing,* adding:
How can they expect to get along after they drive every financial institution outside of their borders? They come to the Dominion Government and say: “We are hard up. We have no money and we cannot collect what is owing to us.” But, I repeat, they are in this condition because of their own laws. /t seems to me that unless there ts some control over the legislation of these provinces we must expect the present condition will continue to exist.»
After the 1935 federal election, new Social Credit M.P.s advocated easier money, which worried Canadian and international finance capital anxious not to see returns threatened by central bank monetary expansion.** The chief spokesmen on the subject of interest rates, usury and the burden of the debt were Joesph Needham (The Battlefords) and J.C. Landeryou (Calgary East). Needham and Landeryou pointed out that high interest rates, when
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
compounded over the years, exceeded the Dominion’s principal indebted- ness.” Needham and his colleagues queried the need to pay interest on money borrowed, or “debt money” advocating the issue of “debt-free money” through the central bank.
We heard a good deal this afternoon about loans and bonds. I say with all seriousness that if the credit of this country is good for a dollar bond, it is just as good for a dollar bill. If the credit of the country is good to float a loan of $100,000,000 through financial institutions, it should be just as good to floar that loan by the government itself.*
Dest OPERATIONS Refunding The first major discussion about refinancing and commissions in the 1930s took place between J.H. Gundy, president of Wood Gundy (representing a syndicate comprised of A.E. Ames, Wood Gundy, Dominion Securities, the Bank of Montreal, the Canadian Bank of Commerce and the Royal Bank), and Liberal Finance Minister Charles Dunning in March 1930. Gundy was anxious to take advantage of the Dominion’s desire to advance refund the huge volume of maturing issues at a time of relatively low interest rates. This proposal was made at a time of severe strain on the dealers who sought an operation that promised both success and large volumes, and thereby, handsome commissions.
Gundy, in the capacity of an unofficial financial advisor, prepared a lengthy memorandum for Charles Dunning, in which he noted:
The amount of re-financing to be done in 1933, 1934 and 1937, aggregating approximately One Billion Two Hundred Million dollars, constitutes a problem that will be too heavy if left to the time of maturity. There is no doubt in my mind it should be dealt with without any further delay, as the first maturity of $447,000,000 is only three years from next November followed by a maturity of $512,000,000 one year later.
This proposal was put on hold until after the June 1930 election, but the question of an early refunding scheme was actively pursued by the Toronto investment dealer and officials of the Department of Finance. It was evident that the new Conservative administration was in fundamental agreement with the thrust of the Gundy memorandum and the urgency of the refunding operation.
Polttical Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
In an interesting “counter-proposal,” put forward by a group of smaller dealers, it was suggested that the Dominion pay advertising costs, that banks receive a negotiated commission, and dealers receive a 1/2 percent commis- sion and sub-agents, 1/4 percent.*° This proposal was not taken up although the suggestion that the Dominion assume the advertising costs was adopted for the Conversion Loan of May 1931 and subsequently became standard operating procedure.”
In September 1930, Watson Sellar, acting deputy finance minister, noted that the refunding of large maturities was “made somewhat acute,” by the “absence of callable fearures which might expedite refunding” and the “presence of tax exemption features.”* The absence of callable features forced the Dominion, as borrower, to offer a substantial inducement to holders to convert their debentures before maturity dates (advance refunding). Early refunding, in the mind of Sellar, would alleviate undue pressures on the domestic capital market, improve the term to maturity structure and avoid “last minute reliance” on New York.*
Documents relating to the resumption of talks with Gundy in the Aurumn of 1930 show official reticence to the prices offered and the commissions requested. Commenting on the Gundy proposal,“ the chief of the Public Debr Division found the charges asked to extinguish the tax-exempt feature too high and the price to the public too low compared with outstanding issues then traded.* In a follow-up memorandum for the minister prepared by Sellar the offer was allowed to lapse as the spread of $1.75 was “too large in favour of the Syndicate.” “I am satisfied,” added Sellar, “that the Canadian banks will hold on to theirs, and I cannot see any hope of getting 1933 tax-exempts from rich men who are paying in excess of 25% income tax, therefore, I do not think the Government should be penalized in interest
rates in testing out a hypothetical project.”*
1931 Conversion Loan
The solution arrived at in early 1931 was rather elegant as it balanced the difficulties in obtaining the surrender of tax-advantaged securities with the need to remove uncertainty about refunding the large maturities in a depressed economy. As Prime Minister Bennett, who was also finance minister at the time, stated the May 1931 conversion loan was designed “to do something to remove the dark cloud” of heavy financing from the horizon.*’ As there was no question that the Dominion would arbitrarily abrogate its contract with respect to call and tax-exempt features, especially in these uncertain times, the May 1931 Conversion loan offer to holders of bonds included extra “talons” attached to the bonds that carried the tax free privilege for the 1931, 1933 and
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
Table 3.3 May 1931 Conversion Loan
Maturity Outstanding Converted Percentage Annual Date ($millions) Converted Savings
5's of $53,000,000 $38,400,000 72.45 $ 197,000 Oct. 1, 1931
5.5's of 73,000,000 37,000,000 50.68 370,000 Nov. 1, 1932
5.5's of 446,000,000 —. 273,200,000 61.26 2,732,000 Nov. 1, 1933
5.5's of 511,000,000 278,200,000 54-44 2,782,000 Nov. 1, 1934
Totals $1,083,000,000 $626,900,000 57.89 6,071,000
Source: House of Commons, Debates, 17th Pachament, 3rd Session, April 6, 1932, p 1756
1934 maturities. All holders would receive the rate of interest originally contracted for until the date of maturity after which the interest rate dropped from 5.5 percent or 5 percent to 4.5 percent.
The Dominion decided against buying out the holders of these bonds by offering a bonus payment. This undertaking might have been politically damaging since it was believed most bonds were closely held by estates, banks and corporations. Instead the Government opted for a program to refund in advance of maturity to minimize the potential for troubles with such large maturing issues hanging over the markets. The loan aimed at the conversion of only $250,000,000 of four World War I issues maturing between October 1931 and November 1934.
Table 3.3 illustrates what issues were converted and the percentage of each issue converted. The table also shows that the investors’ response to the offer was extremely good for the Dominion received conversion requests for nearly 60 percent of the maturities while only aiming for 25 percent. The issue was unique in the sense that all tranches were callable ten years before the final maturity date with 60 days’ notice. Bennett estimated the annual savings from this operation to be approximately $6 million per annum.* This highly successful conversion loan was subsequently followed by Refunding Loans in 1933 and 1934 which converted a further $475 million.
Political Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
The conversion rates for the earliest maturities were greater than for later maturities, which reflects the greater uncertainty in the minds of holders of locking in rates farther into the future. As it turned out, the Dominion gained an advantage from fewer conversions since rates fell between May 1931 and November 1933 and 1934.
The Drive for Lower Interest Rates
The main push for lower interest rates came during the summer of 1932 after the crisis in Europe stemming from Britain’s departure from the gold standard. With continuing deflation and low demand for industrial credit, the United Kingdom government during 1932 floated a very successful conversion loan. This operation set the tone for the Canadian domestic market.” Adding support to this direction were Canadian pronouncements at the World Monetary and Economic Conference in 1932 promising Canadian co-operation in bringing the rate of interest down further. Intense pressure was being exerted by western opposition M.Ps to lower interest rates.
At a meeting in September 1932, an effort to expand credit through a “rediscounting” operation was attempted. Edgar Rhodes arranged an increase in advances to the banks under the Finance Act. Under the agreement, the Dominion sold the banks $35 million in 4 percent Treasury notes that the banks then pledged for Dominion Notes (e.g., currency) at 2.5 percent. This rediscounting proposal was reluctantly accepted by the bankers who objected “on the ground that they had more money in their tills now than they could find good risks for, Leman expressing the view, which was concurred in by the others, that the ratio of depositors to borrowers at the present time was about five to one.”’° Rhodes evidently was worried about financing “as cheaply as possible, and with as little embarrassment as was inevitable in connection with a large transaction.”* This effort was greeted with some skepticism in social democratic quarters as inflationary along with similar doubts in the halls of financial institutions.”
Ac the same meeting, Watson Sellar reiterated the Dominion’s desire for lower rates and credit expansion by introducing the possibility of a political backlash should the banks not fall into line. According to the Canadian Bankers’ Association record:
The Comptroller of Finance suggested the original proposal for three-year treasury bills would enable the banks to borrow on them under the Finance Act, thus providing a showing of increased advances which would be some answer to the demands in the west and elsewhere, particularly since the publication of the report of the
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Monetary Committee of the Imperial Conference recommending an increased supply of cheap money as a means of raising commodity prices. Otherwise at the forthcoming revision of the Bank Act there would most certainly be a controversy over the utilization of the Finance Act.*
Unfortunately, for the Dominion, the banks interpreted advances as a sign of weakness and consequently other outstanding advances were drawn down making the effect on credit expansion negligible. Between December 1932 and April 1933 advances declined from $59 million to $39 million. Some analysts, including S.R. Noble, assistant general manager of the Royal Bank, believed this action put a halt to further loan liquidation, but the lack of satisfactory loan demand still did not encourage the expansion of loans and investments as loan liquidation proceeded until 1936. It is true however that the banks’ note supply did not decline after 1932 and by 1934 total bank assets began to grow slowly again.
In reviewing the Government's abortive attempts to compel the banks to increase their cash reserves and their lending, Governor Towers later observed:
If it seemed desirable to encourage expansion there was no way for the Government to take the initiative. It is true that an exception to this rule is found in Mr. Bennett's action in November of 1932 when he persuaded the banks to borrow $35 millions under the Finance Act. No mote satisfactory way of accomplishing his purpose was open to him. But the very fact that such a transaction had to take place made it obvious that a central bank must be organized in Canada.
Tied to the question of interest rates was the issue of rates paid depositors— the banks’ major liability. Given a clear desire on the part of the Government to force interest rates down and thus lower its own financing costs, plans were laid to reduce interest paid to depositors. In the Spring of 1933, a statement was made to the House of Commons by Finance Minister Rhodes detailing the Government's reasons for lowering deposit rates on Post Office Savings Bank accounts.
However, believing that it was of the utmost importance to business and trade generally that interest rates should be lowered, the government has reduced the interest rate paid on post office savings bank deposits by one-half of one percent effective May 1, thereby co-operating in the general program to lower interest rates paid on
Polstical Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
savings deposits by the chartered banks and other depositories in Canada. The government participated in this matter to lay the ground for an effective reduction in the cost of money to all classes of borrowers and to promote the stimulus to business recovery which would result therefrom.
In announcing a reduction in the rates paid on post office savings bank accounts, Rhodes was careful to state “the Dominion government is not charged with the duty of determining the rates of interest allowed by chartered banks on deposits nor with the rate of interest charged their customers for banking accommodation.”*’ This was a curious admission for section 9: of the Bank Act set the maximum legal rate of interest charged by a bank at 7 percent and the BNA Act granted Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over banking, interest, currency and credit.*
The importance of reducing interest rates was also shared by the recently appointed deputy minister of Finance, W.C. Clark.
Absolute necessity for gradually effecting a lowering of interest rates
in this country. If this cannot be achieved by normal processes, we will probably face irresistible pressure for compulsory conversion of outstanding debts on an arbitrary basis. We believe it to be very much
in the interest of the banks themselves to co-operate wholeheartedly
with the Government in the attempt to effect a reduction in the
interest burden by normal economic processes.”
At this time several parliamentarians pressed the Government to commit itself to a cheap money policy. For instance, cheap money meant a “good deal below 4 per cent” for H.E. Spencer. During the Autumn 1933 financing discussions, Government officials sounded out the banks on the conversion of maturing obligations. Questions were raised by the banks about the 4 percent coupon rate which might be discounted to yield 4.5 percent, the market rate.” From the standpoint of public psychology and public relations, only a 4 percent coupon rate was acceptable to Dominion officials.
In return for this 4 percent concession, Bennett agreed that all conver- sions would be effected through the banks and for new cash sales “the general presumption would be that the bond dealers were to deal through the banks.”
In July 1934, Edgar Rhodes and W.C. Clark met again with CBA representatives to discuss interest rates. Clark put forward the Government's position that unless interest rates were brought down immediately, “there would develop a strong public attitude in favour of repudiation and scaling
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
down of debts.” In response, CBA President Jackson Dodds held that interest rate sensitive money would leave the country adding that, in his opinion, “there was a still greater necessity for the balancing of budgets and in the case of the Dominion the real problem was the railway problem which Mr. Rhodes readily admitted.”® In order to resolve the impasse, it was arranged to have the banks lower their savings deposit rates further to 2 percent from 2 1/2 percent. The Government also agreed to “use their best endeavours to induce trust and loan companies to reduce their rate.“
Several months later as the Autumn financing approached, the minister requested a meeting with the CBA to confirm this understanding. This meeting followed discussions between bankers and trust company officials on September 21 at which time an agreement was struck to reduce trust company savings rates effective February 1, 1935. This arrangement however was not entirely satisfactory to the banks. According to the CBA record of the meeting:
The President felt that it was possible (reduction of rates) and stated that while the banks did not desire to take any drastic action, they would try to get all organizations in line. He felt that the trust compa- nies should be asked to undertake to accept no new deposits at the present rates, and that such deposits should only be accorded the rates which would be generally effective in January next. Mr. Clark felt there would be no difficulty about this. The President asked Mr. Clark to telephone to representatives of the trust companies after two days. After further discussion it was agreed that Mr. Clark should ring Mr. Watson of the Toronto General Trusts Corporation about 11 a.m. on September 25th. The President also asked Mr. Clark to telephone the Montreal City and District Savings Bank.®
By this nonmarket arrangement, the lowering of financing costs to the Government was transmitted through the banking and financial system reducing markedly the interest paid depositors. The Government's desire to reduce its borrowing costs therefore placed it in the position of acting as an intermediary to bring other financial institutions “into line.”
This in camera, personal, non-arms-length financial relationship was again apparent during negotiations surrounding the refunding operations in the fall of 1934. At the end of July the president of the CBA, Jackson Dodds, and the prime minister debated interest rates over the phone. Bennett insisted the Government could not afford 3 percent, anything in that range would have an adverse effect on the Governments Autumn financing plans. In a revealing exchange:
Political Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
Mr Bennett reiterated this over and over, and said the country and the banks must swim or sink together. Mt. Dodds pointed out the danger of bringing down the interest structure too fast and while admitting this Mr. Bennett still said that the Government could not pay 3% in this instance.
Dodds then went on to point out that the 2.75 percent rate would be unprofitable to the banks and lead in turn to a reduction in bank dividends, to a further undermining in confidence and to a weakening of the country’s credit standing.
The foregoing exchanges demonstrate the positional power of the banks in effecting the lowering of rates, and the shared values of Conservative politicians and bankers. Finally, the influence of parliamentary demands can be seen as an offsetting factor to the shared beliefs of Dominion officials and bankers.
FoREIGN BORROWING New York
In September 1931, Bennett was apprised by his acting deputy of the “disorganized” state of New York’s bond market fearful of a collapse of American savings banks. Given this situation, Sellar thought it was an opportune time to come to market for the view was widely held that Canadian credit was excellent. It was certainly excellent when compared with Latin Ameri- can nations which were defaulting about this time. However, when England went off the gold standard in September 1931, foreign borrowing operations were cancelled in light of the sharp rise in short-term rates in New York during October.*
In 1932, assessments of the New York market took into account the November presidential elections. In order to avoid unsettled market conditions, it was suggested that the refunding of November and December maturities be settled before mid-October. It was believed that the uncertainty of the election result would unsettle the markets for the two or three weeks leading up to the election and, depending on the outcome, for several weeks thereafter. Subsequently, U.S. $60,000,000 in one-year treasury notes were sold on October first, well before the U.S. presidential election.
London
In London, after the success of the huge United Kingdom refunding loan in the summer of 1932 signalled a return to lower, long-term rates, the Canadian High Commissioner was advised that the time was now right to come to market.
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
...if carried through at once, would meet with a favourable reception in the City of London, which point we feel to be of tremendous consequence inasmuch as it entails Canada’s first entry into the London market as a borrower since pre-war days, and therefore, the success is of utmost importance.... We trust that you and your Government will appreciate the fact that only an extraordinary abundance of idle funds in London, enable us to put up such advantageous terms, and we take this opportunity of stressing the fact that absolute secrecy on this matter is essential to its successful conclusion.
What was secret about this operation seemed to be the rather peculiar recommendation from Messrs. Rowe, Swann and Co. that “an understanding that a substantial portion of the proceeds would be devoted to the purchasing of British Rolling Stock for use on the State Railways” would be of consider- able assistance in making the issue a success.”? High Commissioner Ferguson's diplomatic reply read, in part, “I am quite sure, however that the desire of the Canadian Government will be to buy here anything they cannot procure at home.”” This exchange can be considered the only blatant guid pro quo demanded in the documents on foreign borrowing examined during the period under study.
Another instance of market advice from London came from Nivisons and Company in regard to the possible conversion of the 3 1/2 percent stock of 1930-1950. Nivisons advised:
The market is at present in position to deal with further large loans and we expect that there will now be a pause and that the Bank of England will not favour any more issues for the moment. Recent events in the Dominion do not make the present moment any more opportune. At the same time the British Government remains firm and money cheap and it is confidently expected that after a rest from new loans the way will be open again when we will immediately advise you.”
The preceding advice incorporated what Nivisons believed to be the stance of the central monetary authority, the Bank of England. Naturally, one of the most important variables in timing an issue was to avoid conflict of dates with an expected treasury financing. As the market could absorb only so much financing each day, it was essential for the borrower to know the dates that were relatively free of major corporate and governmental bond issues. Also critical was the merchant bank's attention to “recent events in the
Political Uncertainty and New Institutional Arrangements
Dominion.” This was an allusion to the spread of social credit ideas in the west and to continuing depressed economic conditions that did little to support the Dominion’s reputation.
After-tax Rates of Return
American and British investors, like their Canadian counterparts, sought as high a return on invested capital as possible, taking into account foreign withholding taxes. The existence of withholding taxes led necessarily to a discounting of the bonds by foreign investors. Undertakings by the Government or corporations that bond issues would be free of tax were and still are an integral part of foreign borrowing. Canadian governments and companies borrowing abroad frequently covenant to reimburse lenders up to a specified amount if taxes were imposed during the term of the financial contract.”
In June 1931, Finance Minister R.B. Bennett introduced a two percent withholding tax on interest and dividends payable to nonresidents. The rationale or justification for the proposal was that holders in the United Kingdom, France and the U.S. could use the tax payable as a credit against their own taxes payable. Nevertheless in the face of strong opposition from international finance capital, Bennett withdrew the proposal on July 16th, commenting that che move was inopportune in view of “European repercussions.”
During the Depression, worries of foreign investors surfaced several times that the cash-poor Dominion and provincial governments might impose special withholding taxes. For example, in March 1933, Edgar Rhodes proposed a5 percent tax on all dividend and interest payable in Canadian dollars (with the exception of the Government of Canada) to all nonresidents. This tax also applied to interest payable under optional pay securities in foreign currencies trading at a premium to the Canadian dollar.” Predictably objections were heard from the financial press as well as from Quebec Premier Taschereau that this measure would harm Canada’s and Quebec’s credit.”* On the London exchange, Canadian securities trading was suspended. At home Bennett and Rhodes were attacked for violating “sanctity of contract” on the basis that once a contract was signed then the holder had a right to be free of taxes for the duration of the contract.” Anxiety concerning the levy of the withholding tax prompted R. Nivison and Company, the London investment house, to write the Bank of Montreal. Nivisons stressed the vexatious un- certainty surrounding Dominion, provincial and municipal bond taxation and called for a Dominion:
...understanding with the Provinces that no Dominion taxation of any kind will be levied on holders of Provincial Stock and Bonds
§t
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
who are not resident in Canada. As soon as the policy of the authorities here permits of Provincial and Municipal borrowing, it must surely be in the interests of the Dominion of Canada to afford every facility for these operations in London, and to do this it is essential that the Provinces should be able to give the same under- taking to the investors as the Dominion itself...English investors have become insistent on adequate protection, from such taxation, and there is little prospect of their being induced to invest their money in stocks which are not safeguarded in the manner suggested above.”
Nivisons strongly intimated that Dominion bond prices would be discounted should the Dominion or provincial governments make moves to penalize foreign investors. This request also suggests chat, in the eyes of the foreign creditor, Dominion, provincial and municipal credit were virtually synonymous, at least as far as “market psychology” was concerned. After several weeks of intense pressure, Rhodes and Bennett amended the proposal and instead imposed a 5 percent tax on all dividends and interest received from Canadian debtors (except the Dominion of Canada) by nonresidents. In addition, a withholding tax of 5 percent was made payable for Canadian residents holding optional pay bonds that were at a premium to the Canadian dollar.”
Canada’s dependence on the goodwill of foreign bondholders also made the Dominion vulnerable to provincial politicians’ proclamations about finance capital in general. The Dominion’s vulnerability in this matter was painfully apparent during the Spring of 1935 when Premier Mitchell Hepburn of Ontario abruptly cancelled hydro purchase contracts with several major private Quebec power companies.”
The depression years reinforced the importance of government policies in Canada that were hospitable to the claims of finance capital. Politicians were under enormous pressure to revise the rights of debtors and often were obliged to pronounce directly on the centrality of credit-worthiness for the nation. This allegiance was a necessary corollary to the huge refunding and ongoing borrowing operations which, in order to be a success, required favourable capital markets. Favourable markets in turn meant government policies that maintain stability in the relationship between debtors and creditors.
A ‘THe ALBERTA DEFAULT AND Its IMPACT ON THE DoMINIONS CREDIT
THE PROVINCE HAS THE POWER TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR any bank to operate within its borders, to prevent it enforcing its claims for debt, to make the business of money-lending illegal and impossible, to publicise banking practice, and in many ways to inflict severe penalties upon the financial interests. | do not suggest that the financial interests in their turn have not the power to inflict damage upon Alberta but I do not believe that that power, if seriously challenged, is anything like so great as it is popularly supposed to be. Nor do I think that the condition of affairs in Alberta would be very much worse, except possibly for a very short time, if such very ill-advised action upon the part of the financial authorities were put to the test. The financial system is essentially a system of black magic and one of the best protections against black magic is not to believe in it.
Major C.H. Douglas'
ALBERTA’S DEFAULT
On April t, 1936, Alberta was Canada’s first, and only, province to default on a principal debt payment. In this unusual case of a default, the interests of a governmental debtor and institutional creditors clashed. The Dominion government recognized the importance of meeting the expectations of finance capital but Alberta's provincial government was committed to thwarting the claims of finance capital. The reaction of the Dominion government, the Bank of Canada, the chartered banks and international finance capital to the default is well documented. The inter-relacionship of these various players illustrated the importance of government's maintaining “credibility” when borrowing in the capital markets.
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Prelude to Default Economic Backdrop
Before the Leduc oil discovery and the OPEC oil embargo, the economy of Alberta was heavily dependent on the production and marketing of grains. In 1929, nearly 40 percent of provincial income was derived from the activities of the independent commodity producer and wage labour hired by the farmer.’ Deflationary pressures, which commenced on grain exchanges in 1929, reduced the average price per bushel of wheat from $1.14 in that year to a low of 32 cents for 1932.’ The heavy reliance on grains, seeds and hay for income resulted in a staggering drop in farmers’ income (Chart 4.1). Farm receipts were cut to one quarter the level of 1928 by 1933 even though total production was cut by only one-third. While other agricultural sectors, including livestock and fruit and vegetables, also suffered heavy declines these losses were not as extensive nor as consequential to this recently-settled, heavily indebted, grain exporting region. Falling export prices, combined with agricultural protectionism on the continent and the heavy devaluation of the Argentinian and Australian currencies, left the western producer with greatly reduced marketing opportunities, forcing the Conservative government into a band-aid program of stock-piling wheat.‘
The lack of markets, low prices and high, fixed charges for transportation and debt service rendered wheat production virtually uneconomical by 1932. For 1932 in Alberta, Professor D.C. MacGregor estimated that of a total of $67 million in farm receipts, interest consumed one quarter of the farmers’ estimated expenses of $68 million. Debts contracted when wheat sold for $1.25 per bushel became financially impossible at 40 cents a bushel. On top on this difficulty, charges were made by farmers, and substantiated by politicians and bankers, that the legal maximum rate of interest (7 percent) was exceeded by the practice of discounting the farmers’ promissory notes.° The cost of transportation and threshing charges, which at one point constituted more than one half of the total value received by farmers, also cut into their net income.*® And finally, the tariff, which protected the manufacturing industries primarily located in central Canada, tended to re- duce the downward movement of prices of semi-processed and finished goods that were key inputs for production. The Rowell-Sirois study calculated that by 1931, the cost of tariff-protected manufactured goods to the wheat
producer had doubled.’
Causes of the Crisis in Alberta’s Public Finance
There are several related factors that account for the widening of Alberta's deficit in the early 1930s. In the first instance, the Liberal government left a
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
Chart 4.1 Farm receipts and provincial income—Alberta
$millions
I 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Years - - — Farm Receipts —— Provincial Income Source DC MacGregor et al, Natonal Income, A Study prepared for
the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations,
Appendix 4, Table IX-E
legacy of large, unproductive debts for the United Farmers of Alberta. According to the Bank of Canada’s 1937 survey of the Province’s finances:
By the end of 1922, Alberta had direct and guaranteed debt (on which it was paying interest or for which it was later to become liable) which was some 50 per cent larger than in the much older province of Manitoba and more than twice as large as that of Saskatchewan though Saskatchewan had a 30 per cent larger population. Substantially more than half the Alberta total represented accumulated losses and deficits, or so-called assets which were proving a constant drain.*
Among those assets “proving a constant drain” were included $20,000,000 which had to be written off because the Province was unable to maintain its telephone system.’ Another source of the acute financial embarrassment were
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guarantees provided to several railway and irrigation projects in Southern Alberta."° Thus, loose financial management, wildly over-optimistic capital expansion projects and poor judgment left the Farmers’ government with a heavy burden of debt on their hands when it took office in 1921.
The second principle source of Alberta's public indebtedness and revenue deficiency stemmed from the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) policy of Not raising taxes to cover the growing demands for roads, schools, public works and all the operational costs associated with these capital projects. Indeed, per capita taxes in 1929 were lower than the 1921 level." According to the central bank’s analysis, “the province could scarcely have expected a more favourable opportunity than that presented in the years 1925-1929 to recoup itself from the rural areas for some of the large expenditures made on them. The opportunity was allowed to pass, and no reduction in the dead weight debt took place.”"
When the Depression struck the “dead-weight” nature of the debt involving fixed interest charges and an insufficient revenue base, prompted a thorough examination of Alberta's provincial and municipal taxation system. The Alberta Taxation Inquiry Board, appointed in December 1933, took evidence from business, labour, citizens groups and manufacturers. The principal conclusion of the inquiry was a recommendation to boost taxation to the level of other provinces.” This report, along with the recommendations of R.J. Magor, “orthodox financier” and J.C. Thompson, provincial auditor, figured prominently in the production of the Social Credit Government's March 1936 budget that raised tax rates and imposed a two percent retail sales tax.
A third reason for the Government of Alberta's financial predicament was the heavy burden of relief charges especially in the cities of Edmonton and Calgary. Costs for relief and other forms of public assistance soared with the onset of the Depression, more than doubling between 1929 and 1936. Other efforts to reduce costs were made during the 1930s including a 10 percent cut in the salaries of civil servants and reduction in teachers’ salaries.
Character of Alberta's Public Debt
By 1932, after racking up official deficits of $2.3 million and $5.3 million, the credit of the province was virtually exhausted. The province was unable to borrow abroad and could only borrow in Canada from the Dominion or from domestic sources at punitive rates. Between January 1933 and the April 1, 1936 default the Province was able to borrow only $7.6 million from domestic sources while borrowing $26 million from Ottawa during the same
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
Chart 4.2 Alberta's public finances, 1926-1937
“ c & E Fy
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Years
-°-— = Dominion Subsidies - - - Debt Service Charges —— Total Revenue Total Expenditure
Source Royal Commission on Domunton Provincial Relauons, Public Accounts Inquiry, Provincial of Alberta, Comparative Stanstics of Public Finance, 1913, 1921, 1925-1937,
Appendix J, “Revised”, Schedule 7, p 9
period at rates berween 3 and 6 percent. This series of short-term treasury bill financings allowed the Province to avoid default by borrowing from the Dominion at one-half point above federal long-term rates but about 200 basis points higher than the prevailing treasury bill rates.”
The most damaging aspect of the structure of Alberta’s public debt was the existence of optional-payment bonds and the absence of call features (Table 4.1). The optional-payment bond insulated the holder from foreign exchange risk while the issuer’s position could be seriously jeopardized if one currency fell significantly in relation to another. This happened in the wake of England's flight from gold when the Canadian dollar, though trading at a premium in relation to the pound sterling, fell to a 10 to 20 percent discount in New York. As a result, between March 1932 and March 1934, nearly $2 million was expended on unanticipated, extraordinary charges associated
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POLITICS AND PUBLIC DEBT
with the payment of interest and principal to holders in U.S. funds. Had a larger proportion of these optional payment bonds been “London or Canada,” these unexpected charges would not have been incurred. It was not surprising therefore for the provincial treasurer to request a fixed exchange rate and a return to the gold standard as a remedy for the problems associated with exchange rate fluctuations.’ However, it should be remembered that these bonds were issued at a time when fixed exchange rates under the gold standard were the rule of chumb and there was no apparent reason to believe that such dramatic shifts in currency alignments would occur.
A second problem associated with Alberta's large per capita debt was the absence of call features. With a call feature, in a period of falling interest rates, the issuer will normally sell new bonds at lower rates, retire the higher coupon bonds and, in the process, realise substantial interest savings. Of the three series of debentures subject to a call provision, one was callable in 1949 and another in 1962. A third issue of $7,400,000 payable in sterling was callable at any time but at a large premium to be paid the holder, making the provision uneconomic until rates dropped to very low levels. For all intents and purposes then, Alberta’s debt could not be called and this inflexibility made bondholders most unwilling to renegotiate and to return their relatively high yielding stock in exchange for lower yielding securities without any premium paid.
Another factor, which made the default situation more complicated was the debt's international character. Default of Canadian-pay debts was one thing, but default co foreign holders of the optional-pay instruments would, undoubtedly, lead to a general distrust of a// Canadian obligations.
The extent of the fiscal crisis faced by Alberta in the months leading up to the August 22, 1935 Alberta election is captured in the following correspondence between Towers, Deputy Provincial Treasurer J.F. Percival, and George Hoadley, minister of Trade and Industry and Railways and Telephones. At the end of March 1935, Percival tested out the waters to see if the Bank of Canada would be willing to advance a loan to prevent default on an April first maturity, payable in U.S. funds. In a revealing letter co Thomas Bradshaw, Toronto financier and a member of the Bank’s Executive Committee, Towers mooted the idea of becoming the Province’s financial advisor.
Profits," of course, do not enter into it, and there would therefore be no object in our treating this as an isolated transaction to help Alberta over their present difficulty. From that point of view it
would be better to leave them in the hands of the Dominion Government.
If, however, we assume that it is possible to make general arrangements
The Alberta Default and Its Impact 59
Table 4.1 Province of Alberta public debt as at March 31, 1936
Classification Amount % of Total ($thousands Canadian)
Total Outstanding $160,831.0
Direct Issues 154,016.5 Guaranteed Issues 6,814.5 Treasury Bills outstanding 25,427.0 T-bills held by Dominion 25,218.0 Amount of debt callable 15,267.0
Tax Free 134,149.5
Canada 55,804.0
Canada or New York 65,843.0
Canada, New York or 19,915.0 London
Canada or London 4,000.0
London 15,269.0
Coupon Rates
4.0 33,331.0 45 51,756.0 5-0 45:773.0 5.5 8,632.0 6.0 20,890.0 6.5 450.0
Maturing in:
2~5 years 750.0 5-12 years 1,650.0 over 12 years 125,599.90
(excluding treasury bills)
Source Province of Alberta, Comparative Statistics of Public Finance, 1913, 1921, 1925 to 1937, Schedules 10, 1, 13. 14
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with them whereby we would become their financial advisors, with the authority to speak on budgetary matters and general financial policy including the time and terms of public issues the matter deserves careful study. Clark feels that if we can approve the risk we should not overlook an opportunity to start the ball rolling by consummating an arrangement of this kind. Alberta’s financial position is not good, but they have made serious efforts to do their best. As you know, the Province may now be considered one of the strongholds of monetary cranks, and some offsetting influence is highly desirable."’
In exchange for providing advice to Alberta from Towers (Canada’s “Prime Minister ex officio,” according to Major Douglas), Alberta was to become the initial proving grounds for what was essentially a loan council coordinating provincial debt management and budgetary policies. Moreover, Towers foresaw a “partnership” of the province, the provincial government’s banker (Imperial Bank of Canada), and the Dominion.
Later that month, Percival informed Towers that a $2 million loan would not cure the situation “except by prevention of default." Two weeks later, Percival wrote to Towers giving his analysis of the financial and political situation of Alberta.
Present bond prices indicate a wave of non-confidence throughout Canada; and in the face of a decided improvement of our revenues and in practically all lines of commercial business and that of agriculture, it is, to say the least, discouraging to find that pending elections and Government action should destroy what appeared to be a very strong and stable bond market. However, I am not altogether surprised that this should take place. Most of us here are suffering from what might be called a Social Credit headache, and during the next three months anything may happen.”
Percival’s comments were prescient. They also reflect the shared perceptions and assumptions of bankers and treasury department officials of the natural and negative reaction of bond markets to political events which would reduce the price of outstanding issues. Falling prices, in turn determined what it would cost for new money.
That June, George Hoadley, the minister of Trade and Industry called Towers outlining his province's frustrations in attempting to raise $2,000,000 for an election road-building program. “In stressing the Province’s need for the additional money,” wrote Towers later, “Mr. Hoadley said that if they had to confess their inability to proceed with the road program, Aberharts
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
campaign would be greatly assisted.” \t appeared the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Bank of Canada would no longer lend to the Province, at least on the terms the government desired. The Alberta's Government's banker, the Imperial Bank of Canada, was prepared to advance $2,000,000 ifthe Province was willing “to hypothecate the amount due the Province by Canadian Pacific and Canadian National Railways’— approximately $5,500,000 payable in 1939. This hypothecation would also cover existing “IBC” advances to the Province of $4.2 million.?? Later that afternoon, Towers advised the Alberta minister against accepting the bank’s terms.
It had not been the practice in Canada for Provinces or the Dominion to pledge specific assets as security for borrowings and in this case it might be thought that one creditor was obtaining an unfair advantage in view of the fact that the security represented a value of at least $3,500,000 in excess of the new money being obtained; and this excess would be applied as security for existing indebtedness. ] suggested that he should obtain Mr. Bennett's opinion in view of the fact that the Dominion Government is an important creditor and may be called upon for additional assistance.”
However, this time the Dominion did not come to the rescue but the
Imperial Bank did.
Social Credit in Office
In August 1935, newly elected Premier Aberhart did not anticipate that the provincial treasury was so empty thar the regular civil service payroll was imperilled. A temporary loan from the Dominion for $2.2 million was soon arranged with the Bennett government. One active observer of these events, A.J. Hooke, has claimed that conditions were attached to the Bennett loan, namely that Robert Magor, a financial advisor and formerly the “trustee in bankruptcy” of the Dominion of Newfoundland be appointed Alberta's financial advisor.” However, another participant who was also close to these negotiations denied there ever was an understanding between Bennett and Premier Aberhart on this matter. Nevertheless it would appear from a pragmatic point of view, the hiring of Magor and requesting funds from the Dominion were a necessary accommodation in order to meet the payroll and to avoid the prospect of losing credibility in the early part of its mandate.** Moreover Aberhart and his colleagues believed that the issue of straightening out the public finances was a completely separate question from establishing the basic dividend and that Major Douglas need not be offended by the presence of Magor.”
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While correspondence between Premier Aberhart and Major Douglas topped the news in January and February 1936, provincial treasurers were meeting in Ottawa to give initial approval to an amendment to the BNA Act creating a Loan Council.** The day following this historic agreement, Charles Dunning announced the provision of a $2,000,000 loan to the Government of Alberta in order to meet bond maturities. According to press reports “no strings were attached,” nevertheless as events transpired strings were indeed attached.””
Less than one month later, controversy erupted over publication of a letter from Major Douglas condemning the Loan Council proposal that would “filch away” the Province’s financial autonomy and that predicted Alberta would break away from the stranglehold of “orthodox finance.”* As the due date of April first drew closer for the repayment of a direct debenture obligation of $3,200,000 (Canadian), it was learned that the prospect for further Dominion aid was in fact conditional on Alberta's acceptance of the proposal.” Ten days after this disclosure, rumours abounded that the provincial government was about to legislate a compulsory refunding scheme “with teeth in it.” This rumour led Charles Dunning to remind his provincial counterpart that much damage had already been done to prices of Western Canadian bonds from the March 15th announcement of a 3 percent refunding scheme.
The flurry of activity in March 1936 prior to the April 1, 1936 default is indicative of the fear that western provincial defaults would spread and therefore a coordinating mechanism was needed to prevent the floodgates of repudiation and default from bursting open. As the date of the April ist maturity neared, Dunning drew to the attention of Alberta's Treasurer the adverse consequences to the market from political statements originating in
the Alberta capital. On March 17th, Dunning cabled Cockcroft:
Your letter requesting Dominion loan to assist you in meeting April first maturity reached me simultaneously with the Premier's announcement that Province was about to introduce legislation reducing interest rates on outstanding debt apparently without reference to proposed Loan Council (STOP)
Announcement has already had serious adverse effect on market particularly for Western Provincial bonds and proposal if carried out would nullify all efforts already made and proposed to be made by Dominion to protect credit of the Provinces and the Dominion as a
whole (STOP)
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
In view of the action contemplated by Province, I do not see how I could justify to Parliament and to the country the loan for which you are now asking.
In throwing down the gauntlet and, in effect, challenging Alberta to comply with the Dominion’s desire to protect its own creditworthiness, Dunning ran the calculated risk that default would seriously harm the Dominion's credit standing domestically and abroad. However, in the wake of the default, Western bond prices slumped while Dominion bonds held steady indicating that the calculated risk had been successful in isolating Alberta's credit from that of the Dominion.*
On April 1, 1936 the Province of Alberta became the first, and only, provincial government in Canada’s history to default on the principal of a maturing obligation.
Rationale for Default
As Professor Mallory noted, this about-face on the position of the Alberta Government towards the Loan Council left Treasurer Cockcroft in an embarrassing position.” Why had Cockcroft’s commitment to the Loan Council been torpedoed? In all probability, the major factor that determined this about face was the incongruity of the world’s first Social Credit government surrendering control over a key element of its financial affairs to a central bank and the senior order of government. Given the deep-seated, agrarian suspicion of the “fifty big shots,” of “corrupt” eastern politicians and hostility to the “money power,” such submission to financial tutelage would have raised a storm of protest inside the province, the Social Credit party and the Government caucus. Secondly, as the Province claimed, it simply could not meet its principal payment—it did not want to default but it would not submit to Ottawa's ultimatums. Thirdly, default corresponded with the need to refinance the debt at much lower rates. In Aberhart’s mind, the orthodox proposals of Ottawa meant going further and further into debt without any visible benefits accruing to the debtor government. The arbitrary reduction of interest was a way of living within one’s means and was also consistent with Aberhart’s speeches concerning the evils of usury. Finally, default was premised on the grounds that sacrifices should be borne equally. If teachers and civil servants must sacrifice, why should the money power not sacrifice? The austere budget brought in on March 1, 1936, which raised taxes also demonstrated the Government's commitment to balancing its budget and spreading the pain. However, these measures in a time of depression would have to be matched by sacrifices of bondholders.
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BANK OF CANADA AND THE DOMINION GOVERNMENT
A few days before the April 1st deadline, a view similar to Charles Dunning’s March 17th cable was received by Governor Towers from S.R. Noble, assistant general manager of the Royal Bank.
Unquestionably, something must be done to control the expenditures of the Provinces, but the Western ones particularly have had a very severe lesson in the last few years and a default would create a seri- ous situation and set back recovery very materially. /t would, it seems to me, very seriously prejudice our reputation abroad, which we have maintained at tremendous cost.
A few weeks after the actual default, Towers, reflected upon the Alberta default and Western situation:
the Alberta default did not cause any important disturbance in the market for bonds of the Dominion of Canada or of eastern provinces. Even though the Minister of Finance stated that Social Credit did not have anything to do with the Dominion’s decision not to assist Alberta, both foreign and domestic markets have tended to regard the Alberta situation as a very special affair.”
In formulating alternatives to the broader question of the western provinces’ predisposition to default, Towers recognized that default was inevitable (with the possible exception of Manitoba) unless financial assistance was made available by the Dominion. A loan council was problematic in Towers's opinion because “it would be extraordinarily difficult for Saskatchewan and Manitoba to accept a position which would be called one of tutelage at the same time that Alberta and British Columbia were acting independently.” What was needed in Towers's view was a policy that bridled “local opinion” and which called for “more of the benefits as well as the odium of default.” Towers argued that the benefits of default calculated to be approximately $6.5 million in interest per annum were far outweighed by the damage to the Dominion’s credit structure.
It would be penny wise and pound foolish to allow an upset to be caused by western defaults which would not provide more than a fraction of the relief required by the country as a whole, and would, on balance, cause a loss to the country as borrowers abroad, and to the Dominion Government as borrowers anywhere. /¢ must not be overlooked that Dominion Government requirements for new money and refunding during the 1936-37 year are extremely large.”
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
This underscores the Governor's understanding that the credit of provincial and Dominion governments were interdependent, particularly in the minds of international finance capital, and his acute sensitivity to provincial governments’ leanings to default.
Unsettled markets in the wake of the Alberta default forced the Dominion to delay a proposed loan in early June 1936. According to Deputy Finance Minister Clark:
The Alberta development and the worsening situation in France make it inadvisable to go ahead with the issue next week. We propose, however, to have everything in readiness in order that we may make the public offering on Wednesday next if conditions appear satisfactory on Monday morning. On Monday the French Chamber meets and the new Government takes office, and the early morning cables will give us the necessary information on which to make our decision. Prices cannot, of course, be determined definitely until that time.
Bond prices rallied during the summer of 1936, but at the end of August the Alberta Social Credit government brought down a series of measures that brought more nervousness to markets. These measures included a cut in interest by one half on all outstanding provincial securities and municipal securities,*° a retroactive cancellation of all interest owed on farm mortgages since 1932," and the establishment of an “Alberta Credit House.”# That winter, the Canadian cabinet was confronted with a dilemma. Should the Dominion rescue what some, including King, believed to be an impossible situation by pouring in “good money after bad” or permit Alberta’s neighbouring province, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, to default? As Towers stressed earlier the “generosity” of the Dominion was necessary to ensure the very success of the refunding operations during the coming fiscal year. According to Professor Neatby:
Charles Dunning who had shown so little sympathy for provincial administrations a year before, had now shifted his ground because as Minister of Finance one of his major responsibilities in 1937 would be refunding of more than three hundred million of federal bonds. He hoped to sell the new issues at 3 per cent instead of the 5 per cent or higher on the maturing issues, for an annual savings of some six million dollars, but much depended on the federal government at the time. He preferred not to have provincial gov- ernments defaulting while he was refunding the federal debt.”
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Indeed by the beginning of 1939, the Dominion had advanced to the western provinces some $100 million in direct relief and grants in aid to keep the western provinces (Alberta excepted) afloat by ensuring that timely interest and principal payments were made.* These actions by the Dominion underline the understanding by government finance officials of the interdependence of federal and provincial credit-worthiness.
Another example of the nervousness of Dominion officials about the western situation is provided by R.B. Bryce in his history of the Finance Department during the Depression. Bryce records a series of discussions between Manitoba and Saskatchewan premiers and Clark, Dunning and Towers. Dominion officials were strongly opposed to unilateral reduction of interest rates by the provinces, particularly at a time of falling interest rates as disturbances to the market would rebound negatively on the Dominion. Manitoba Premier Bracken, who depended on the minority support of Social Credit to govern had ‘found that the suggestions Manitoba might be forced to follow Alberta’s example and repudiate the interest on its outstanding obligations had a noticeable impact on federal representatives.” The result of these discussions was a Bank of Canada study of the financial problems of the western provinces and the provision of Dominion funds to meet the financial obligations of Manitoba and Saskatchewan.*
RESPONSE OF THE CHARTERED BANKS
Soon after the initial legislative program of the Social Credit government became known in April 1936, the CBA solicited the views of Graham Towers and Clifford Clark on the crisis.© In May, Towers advised the banks that they should seek representation on the Bondholders’ Committee and participate actively in its activities.” In June, Clark’s ideas were tapped. Initially, the depury felt “Section 138” ought to be applied on the matter of “prosperity certificates.”*® Clark later expressed some reservations about disallowance, suggesting the Province should “learn from actual experience that it (dated scrip) could not be operated successfully.” Both Towers and Clark believed that banks would be well-advised not to accept these certificates with Towers advising that the “practical difficulties” be stressed.”
It was not until the reduction of interest payments on the provincial debt was proclaimed on May 30, 1936 that a meeting was held of institutional bondholders in Toronto. At this informal meeting of 25 representatives of insurance, mortgage, trust and loan companies and chartered banks, there existed grave misgivings as to “what length the Alberta Government eventually might go unless some group (naturally the bondholders) discussed the whole
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
matter with the Government.”*° The banks thought it necessary to solicit Towers’s opinion on the matter. Towers replied he believed the committee was “greatly needed” and that bank representation would “strengthen” the situation. George W. Spinney of the Bank of Montreal was named the Association's representative. However, apart from the report sponsored by the Bondholders’ Committee known as the “Elliott-Walker Report,” meetings with the Government grew fewer and fewer as the Aberhart Government became embroiled in various legislative schemes to vitiate creditors’ claims.
In September 1936 H.R. Milner, a prominent Edmonton lawyer and businessman, recommended a clandestine funding arrangement to funnel moneys to anti-Aberhart news and information organizations. Milner’s recommendations are interesting because they reflect a greater awareness of the animosity directed at the banks by the Alberta population than that of bankers cloistered in Montreal and Toronto. Moreover, he was aware of the great organization, oratory, public relations and commitment on the part of the Social Credit forces.
An Alberta committee [wrote Milner] is exceedingly dangerous. The money should be collected in the East and from the Western people who are interested, and should be given to one man whose name should not be known to more than two Eastern men at most and everything should be left to his judgment."
Thus, the seriousness of the situation is illustrated by the suggestion of a clandestine money raising operation. In analysing the prospects for using media outlets and influencing news, Milner observed that of the rural dailies and weeklies run mainly by independent operators, only three or four should be used. While The Calgary Herald was supportive, the Calgary Albertan was under Aberhart’s control and The Edmonton Journallacked “intestinal fortitude.” Milner recommended the purchase of a controlling interest in the Calgary radio station “Voice of the Prairie” for about $35,000." The foregoing reveals the sweeping plans recommended to combat the threat of expropriation of institutional creditors’ security interests and how this strategy recognized the importance of influencing the dissemination and interpretation of news stories.
On September 1, 1936 the lieutenant-governor gave Royal Assent to several bills including The Reduction and Settlement of Debts Act and The Debt Adjustment Act. The former Act limited interest and principal owed after 1932, while the latter established a Debt Adjustment Board whose arbitration decisions between debtors and creditors were deemed to be final.
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In response to this massive intrusion into debtor-creditor relations, the CBA retained counsel in Edmonton (H.R. Milner), Toronto (W.N. Tilley), and Montreal (R.C. McMichael) to prepare the banks’ case against provincial intrusion into the sphere of credit and banking. In a 16-page “draft brief” to the governor-in-Council requesting disallowance of these Acts, the Dominion was urged not to construct too narrow a view of its powers and overriding responsibilities for “peace, order, and good government.”
...it is apparent that the question of Dominion intervention by way of disallowance or a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada does not rest solely upon the constitutional validity of the Alberta legisla- tion, but upon the serious consequences to the citizens of Canada as well as to Confederation itself, if'a unit of Confederation is permitted to evince such disregard of contractual obligations, of fundamental rights, of the stability of financial institutions, and of the very terms of Confederation as crystallized in the British North America Act.”
In sum, peace, order and good government were reduced to the preservation of the existing financial order. Underpinning the banks’ case was the assumption that any violation of the sanctity of contract would harm the general public through a general weakening in the economic order.
Public Relations Initiatives
In October 1936, the CBA in attempting to win its case with the Alberta public, requested bank managers to report cases of actual hardship of those suffering under “Mr. Aberhart’s doctrines.”* The stated objective was “a view to bring home to the electorate the damaging effect of such legislation, not only to those possessed of means, but as well to the man in the street.”* In the case of The Bank of Nova Scotia's canvas only two instances of hardship were obtained including one news clipping. FG. Burr reported:
As you can well surmise, we hear all sorts of stories of hardships that have been caused by the Provincial legislation in this Province, but it is practically impossible to pin these stories down to any actual cases. I have made discreet enquiries from trust and loan companies and lawyers, but have not been able to get anything that would be of value to you.*
This finding should have been no surprise in a region where only a relatively few individuals would suffer from reductions in interest payments or those who had placed all their savings in Alberta government obligations.
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
The importance of a stronger media voice to counter Social Credit agitation culminated in the Canadian Bankers’ Association's announcement in December 1936 of the appointment of Vernon Knowles, former managing editor of the Winnipeg Tribune, as “Public Relations Adviser.”*’ In aiming to counter Social Credit’s message, CBA ads were directed at refuting the fallacies spread by Aberhart and others about commercial banking and credit. One such advertisement emphasized that “bankers cannot perform miracles.”* In rebutting the monetary reformers’ accusations of a money power, Knowles pointed to the new institutions of the Bank of Canada and inspector-general of Banks to emphasize that banks were no longer a power unto themselves, if they ever were. Another advertisement opined, that “any group of responsible citizens who will get $500,000 in capital subscribed and half of it paid up, and who fulfil the requirements of the Bank Act, can start a bank.” This claim was made in spite of the fact that a bank charter had not been issued in Canada for over a decade; hardly a record that suggested competition and free entry into the business of banking.©
Another dimension of the banks’ publicity was to convince the public of the dangers of the socialization of credit. “Credit—It belongs to you—the community does not own it,” read one ad, which appealed to freedom-loving, enterprising individuals who were responsible and a sound risk. As well, the banks stressed their fiduciary role by stating “because of the bank’s responsibility to its depositors it can make loans only where repayment is certain.”*' The banks during this period were promoted as secure financial bastions protecting the lowly individual’s hard-earned credit and savings against the claims of the undeserving masses seeking special favours. In this crusade to redefine their function as trustees of the savings of the ordinary folk, the banks were solidly supported by the financial press who omitted to mention who owned or controlled the banks that “looked after” the savings of millions of Canadians.
The other major facet of this campaign of advocacy advertising purported to present “A Few Candid Words About Bank Earnings.” Readers were informed chat “half of one per cent a year on total assets is not much of a profit margin for any business, corporate or individual.” The reader was then apprised of the banks’ central role in Canada’s economic life in terms of payroll expenditures, employment and tax payments.”
While it is difficult to estimate the impact of this campaign and similar radio messages upon the Alberta population, in retrospect, it seems safe to say its impact was minimal neither strengthening or weakening the resolve of the devoted Social Crediter or the staunch bank supporter. The CBA’s
decision to hire a public relations adviser is instructive for it indicates the
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seriousness with which Social Credit was regarded by central Canadian bankers. No longer were august annual sermons to shareholders’ meetings, published in many Canadian dailies, sufficient to ward off thoughts of repudiation and Social Credit. The Aberharr movement certainly forced the banks to take a more active role in shaping the public’s perception of their role in the Canadian economy.
Plans for Retribution
The gravity of the situation in the winter of 1936-37 is apparent when examining the various alternatives circulating through CBA offices at that time. These proposals included “intimation” of a lower deposit savings rate for Albertans or an actual reduction, a “turnover charge and closing of 50 or 60 branches,” as well as “lending at the current rates of interest, by way of discount wherever possible.”* However these proposals were not universally endorsed. The Nova Scotias H.E. Patterson called these reductions “inadvisable and impolitic.”* Yet by July 1937, despite some internal resistance, ads were being readied for the press to announce the reduction effective August 1, 1937. Only the wise counsel of the Bank of Canada’s governor served to postpone a move which, at this time, would surely have been “impolitic” and would have been perceived by Albertans as intimidation. When conferring with general managers in July 1937, Towers expressed “surprise at hearing this for the first time, and pointed out how awkward a situation might have been created if our first news had been from some reporters who enquired what we thought of the new development.”
This proposal was abandoned only to resurface a year later after more Social Credit legislation was introduced to raise bank taxes dramatically. The Nova Scotia's Patterson stood by his earlier position, arguing:
It would be inadvisable for the banks to take steps to recoup themselves in any particular province for excessive taxation levied by it. We feel that whatever explanations the banks may make, they rather than the Government, would be the target of public criticism and it is still our opinion that to take retaliatory measures in Alberta would only provoke reprisals on the part of the Government.
When learning of a second move to lower deposit rates in the summer of 1938, Towers cautioned CBA President S.B. Dobson to “think cwice” before embarking on such a course. The reasons for so doing are outlined below.
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
...the banks should fight on the line that there was one banking system for Canada, and that the terms of business should be approximately equal throughout the Dominion. That does not mean, for example, that loaning rates must be the same in the case of all borrowers, but there should certainly be no dividing line as between one province and another...I mentioned that Mr. Dunning was generally in agreement with what I said to this point, and then went on to say that if the banks consistently fought on the line of Dominion-wide banking, so to speak, the Dominion must inevitably protect them in the event of an emergent or an intolerable situation developing—unless the Dominion abrogated its responsibility for banking, a surrender which I did not believe could take place.
In short, the central bank sought to maintain the constitutional and financial status quo. The central bank's role in preventing what might be termed a colossal blunder enabled the banks to retain their credibiliry with the Dominion government. This contact and unity of purpose to protect the federally-regulated banking system allowed the chartered banks to put forward a united position to the Alberta Government. Towers’s counsel underlined a strong commitment of the Bank of Canada to both the constitutional and financial status quo.
Dest Moraroria LEGISLATION
During the August 1936 session in which the issue of prosperity certificates was authorized, the Legislature passed The Reduction and Settlements of Debts Act. The Act was motivated by the perceived arrogance and intransigence of lenders and their refusal to reschedule debts originally contracted when commodity prices were high. The Act, which was declared ultra vires the following June, caused The Monetary Times to thunder:
At the recent session of the legislature, however, which met on
August 25 and prorogued on September 1, it was evident that he
(Premier Aberhart) had lost control and that the back benchers in
the party under the leadership of Honourable Lucien Maynard were
pushing him into measures which not only strike at the very roots of credit and monetary security, but seem to be heading towards the establishment of a Soviet government in the prairie province.... The
extremists were in the saddle and from the direction in which their
achievements showed them to be riding, they are heading for some-
thing akin to Sovietism, if not the genuine article.
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The Act reduced all debts incurred prior to July 1, 1932 by applying all interest payments after that date to the reduction of principal. Another unusual feature of the Act was the inclusion of Section 16 that read “the provisions of this Act shall not be construed as to authorize the doing of any act or thing which is not within the legislative competence of the Legislative Assembly.” This disclaimer did not make the Act immune from the courts which held thar this section could not stop the judiciary from ruling on the constitutionality of the Act. Significantly, at about the same time, Saskatchewan's Liberal government also introduced sweeping debt reduction legislation which limited maximum interest chargeable on all farm mortgages to 6 percent (clearly ultra vires) and wiped out all interest arrears to January 1935.
Legal Analysis
Although the banks’ total holdings of Alberca Government securities, including bank pension funds, was very small (about $3.4 million or 0.1 percent of all their assets), legal opinions sought by the CBA recommended a legal challenge. W.N. Tilley believed the courts would not allow the abrogation of valid contracts in the guise of interest reduction on municipal debts.”° As far as the bankers were concerned, the Municipal Securities Interest Act would inflict serious harm on the municipalities’ borrowing ability since “there is no means whereby lenders can be forced to extend new credit where the interest rate is inadequate.”” Thus the withholding of credit was seen as a legitimate response to defend the banks financial interests.
As far as the Reduction and Settlement of Debts Act was concerned, this too was regarded as unconstitutional. Opined King’s Counsel Tilley:
A Provincial Act cannot authorize anything to be done which is not within the competence of the Legislative Assembly. The proper construction of an Act is for the courts and the question the courts must decide is not whether it professes to authorize something to be done not within the competence of the Legislature.”
In Tilley’s view, chis Act was clearly beyond the competence of the provincial legislative assembly.
Tilley recommended reference to the Supreme Court of Canada for a quick decision that would avoid accusations of heavy-handedness that might raise Aberhart’s standing with the Alberta voters. However, from a strategic
point of view, Tilley added:
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
the main application to the Government should be for disallowance and that it should be pressed strongly. If it is acceded to, the result will not be unsatisfactory. If it is not, the Government would be more apt to refer the matter to the Courts as a concession. But I think nothing should be done to indicate to the Government that any other view is entertained than disallowance and reference should only be suggested as an alternative.”
This assessment was not shared by H.R. Milner who thought that disallowance would be playing into Aberhart’s hands. As there was no organized demand for federal intervention into the debr settlement area, it was better to let the legislation be challenged in the courts. Milner added the warning:
The Federal Government by now should realize that it is being, or soon will be, faced with a national emergency brought on by Aberhart’s efforts to encroach on the Federal jurisdiction. What be does today may very well subsequently be done by other provinces. The failure of the Federal Government to disallow the Ontario Hydro contract legislation will present the chief obstacle to disallowance in Alberta.’
The CBA did prepare a draft brief to the governor-in-Council petitioning for disallowance of this legislation. The brief stressed the serious consequences to the Dominion and its citizens of this flagrant disregard for contractual obligations. Milner’s view of a social credit contagion also found its way into a brief to Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe from W.N. Tilley.
The Government might also well bear in mind that there is a real danger of the ideas of repudiation of debt, embodied in the Alberta legislation spreading to other provinces, where governments may be forced to follow Alberta’s lead. It is therefore important that any action which the Dominion Government may see fit to take be not deferred too long. The indirect effect of such intervention would not be confined to Canada, but would undoubtedly improve the credit position of Canada and her provinces in the money markets of the world.”
The implications were clear: the Dominion must prevent the social credit contagion from spreading. To do so would maintain and, possibly strengthen the Dominion’s credit standing in world markets. The banks were clearly sending a message to the Dominion government that they expected the Dominion to protect its constitutional terrain and thereby its credit-standing.
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The Dominion remained cautious in its approach; making the distinction between protecting financial contracts and overruling legislation widely popular with the western population (which had elected a great many Liberals the year before) was a difficult political dilemma.
Further Social Credit Initiatives
Declaration by the courts in February 1937 that a number of Acts’ were beyond the competence of the provincial legislature did not bring peace to financial institutions operating in Alberta. The manager of The Bank of Nova Scotia in Alberta, EG. Burr, informed his general manager that the court's decision “is only going to make Mr. Aberhart go a little farther, and we are hourly expecting a proclamation of a general moratorium given him in the Debt Adjustment Act passed at the last session.”” Indeed, on February 23rd, an Order-in-Council was passed declaring a 60-day moratorium on all debts assumed before July 1, 1936.”
That June, the Legislature passed The Postponement of Debts Act author- izing the Cabinet “to postpone debt payments, prohibit issue of processes in courts of the Province and to stay proceedings in all civil actions.”” If the Government was unable to insulate the citizen’s property (and civil rights) from the jurisdiction of the courts, it would prevent creditors access to courts to satisfy their claims under the province's constitutional responsibiliry for the administration of justice. Similarly The Debs Adjustment Act, 1937 also purported to limit the activities of creditors subject to the Debt Adjustment Board’s permission and reaffirmed the Board’s powers against the court's remedies of injunction, prohibition, certiorari, or mandamus.® This Act was disallowed in June 1938 shortly after the Liberal election victory in Saskatchewan so as not to send too strong a message that the federal Liberal government was unsympathetic to debtors’ rights.
Another ingenious statutory device employed to free debtors from their creditors was The Judicature Amendment Act, 1937, an omnibus bill, subsequently disallowed, that barred all courts from hearing legal challenges to provincial Acts unless the provincial cabinet agreed.”
The following April, The Homeowners Security Act was passed to protect the mortgagors of farm homes and urban residences. The legislation protected the latter from foreclosure by requiring the creditor to deposit with the Court Clerk $2,000 in order to proceed with his legal claim. Without the deposit, action was automatically stayed. Should the creditor comply by depositing $2,000 and successfully repossess the home, the $2,000 would then be released to the dispossessed enabling the person to purchase a new home.*
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
Thus the creditor was caught in a “Catch-22” position and the debtor in the envious position of receiving $2,000, which in those days was usually sufficient to buy a home outright.
This measure was especially irksome for the banks because they held between $16 million to $20 million of collateral mortgages in Alberta, that is, loans secured by residential property." In addition, an amendment to The Limitations of Actions Act, 1935 would further handcuff creditors in realizing on their assets.* Tilley, in an internal CBA memorandum sketched out the alarming implications of this new legal device introduced by the Social Credit administration.
In other words, bank debts incurred before that date (1 July 1936) where the debtor has not signed a renewal note and refuses to do so, will be outlawed in slightly over two years. It is evident that if debtors take advantage of this legislation to any great extent the effect upon the banks will be serious."
This measure, in conjunction with amendments being made to the Debt Adjustment Act, would, according to Tilley, make its “practically impossible for a bank to institute any legal proceedings in Alberta, without the consent of the Debt Adjustment Board” known to favour debtors’ interests. Tilley believed it essential that the legislation be stopped.
While this statute is now in force, the effect of its provisions is not yet generally realized. It is important, therefore, that if anything at all is done to affect its operation, it should be done speedily for as soon as Alberta debtors become generally aware of its provisions [it] will be almost impossible for the banks to obtain signatures to renewal notes or other agreements of that nature.*
The fears of the past two years were now being confirmed—no longer were the banks’ security only indirectly subject to depreciation, but they were being confiscated.
A growing frustration about the Alberta situation was apparent in a letter sent Finance Minister Dunning by CBA President Sydney Dobson in May 1938. In referring to the Limitations of Actions Act, the Homeowners’ Security Act and the 1938 Securities Tax Act, Dobson asserted:
Such legislation as this is purely confiscatory and is designed to assist debtors without regard to the rights of or its effects on creditors of any class. It is intended to force creditors generally to compromise
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with their debtors, on such terms dictated by the latter and approved by the Debt Adjustment Board. In a word, this is bankruptcy legislation which interferes with banking as well as with long term lending and with trade and commerce between Alberta and the other parts of Canada and other countries.*
Dobson also added these laws were “progressively disruptive of the moral fibre and common honesty of Canadian citizens in Alberta and neighbouring provinces.”
Throughout the 1936 to 1939 period, Alberta’s Social Credit government placed Canada’s banking system on its heels. With the reins of power and with access to sophisticated legal advice of the attorney general’s department, the banks were forced to mobilize both legal expertise as well as media exper- tise in order to combat Social Credit’s legislative initiatives. The archival records illustrate the close coordination between the CBA and Governor Towers. This coordination is hardly surprising since the banks and central bank shared similar, if not identical views on the nature of lending, perfection of security and legal recourse when a borrower defaulted. Having served as a senior officer with the Royal Bank of Canada and therefore having associated with other senior Canadian bankers, Towers was no doubt regarded as a critical ally for the banks in their quest to limit the impact of Alberta’s Social Credit. Towers and the institution of a central bank proved invaluable to the chartered banks in the sense that bankers had a trusted ally with access to the highest levels of the political system. It may be argued that the Alberta situation was the first major test of Towers's mettle as the new governor. His action in warning the banks against a foolhardy course of action confirms this allegiance to the status quo.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CAPITAL
The segment of foreign markets trading Canadian bonds was also sensitive to news about Canada's trade balance, national income, government revenues and expenditures, and the domestic political situation. The election of William Aberhart’s Social Credit government and the deteriorating fiscal position of the three prairie governments posed serious concerns for the Dominion. From an international creditors’ perspective, it was believed chat the Dominion, especially the new central bank, should make every effort to prevent Alberta's default from spreading east and west.
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
London
Shortly after the Bank opened for business, Towers wrote Sir Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England, outlining the difficulties facing the western provinces and probing Norman on their possible consequences for Canadian credit. “In a way,” wrote Towers, “it is foolish for the Dominion Government to continue to foot the bill on the present basis. Ic simply means that the Dominion Government is indirectly paying interest at higher rates.” More particularly,"® Towers wished to know the impact on the Dominion’s credit rating should the federal government step in to guarantee provincial refinancing.
In London, the Alberta default did not have a major effect on Canadian credit as might be expected. Towers was correct in observing that Alberta would be treated as an exceptional case. Lester Pearson in a June 1936 dispatch to O.D. Skelton, undersecretary of State for External Affairs, noted that British anxiety centred on Alberta while Dominion bonds were trading nearly on a par with British Exchequer issues. Pearson reported that questions were being asked of the secretary of State for the Dominions as to the steps being taken by His Majesty’s government to protect the holders of Alberta and City of Vancouver bonds.*? In November 1936, Towers visited London and met with Sir Montagu Norman. Sir Montagu expressed the view that “any form of western default (was) unwise,” and argued for efforts to keep these debtor provinces afloat.”
These conversations and others illustrate the close connection foreign bondholders drew between the Dominion’s and provincial credits. There also appeared to be a set of expectations built up about Ottawa's decision-makers; expectations that aberrant behaviour, namely default, repudiation or social credit, must be discouraged, and preferably eliminated. A document prepared by the Finance Department for the 1937 Imperial Conference entitled “Interest Reduction Legislation of the Province of Alberta,” attempted to address these concerns and supports the view that foreign bondholders and governments expected that Ottawa's decision-makers should police the unorthodox activities of certain provincial governments.
The following passage, presumably written with the input from the Department of Justice, traces the use of the federal power of disallowance, which allowed the Dominion government, through the lieutenant governor, a Dominion appointee, to veto provincial legislation. The power prompted expectations, particularly from countries with a unitary system of government, such as the United Kingdom, that the Dominion would rein in “radical” governments.
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Though the power of disallowance has been frequently exercised in the past, it is important to remember that no provincial statute has been disallowed in recent years. A different conception in regard to the disallowance of provincial statutes has grown up and it is now widely believed chat disallowance is not the proper remedy except in very exceptional cases. Ifa provincial statute is unconsti- tutional, the remedy lies in attacking the validity of the legislation by an action taken in the courts in the ordinary way. If, however, a provincial statute is clearly constitutional but is objectionable for other reasons it is one of the consequences of the granting of responsible government that redress should lie with the electorate of that province. Any other view would place the Dominion in an intolerable position and require it to judge of the propriety of statutes passed by a province in relation to the exclusive legislative auchor- ity assigned to the province. The Dominion does not admit, however, that the power of disallowance is obsolete and could not now be exercised if a proper occasion arose but it should be understood that the power of disallowance is likely to be exercised only in exceptional cases when no other remedies are available, and the interest of the Dominion is directly affected.”
Here the Dominion was clearly hedging its bets—it could plead “provincial tights” when it came to ignoring Duplessis’s attacks on Communists or it could disallow legislation that “directly” affected the Dominions interests regarding its credit standing. As events unfolded, foreign investors’ expectations played a part in pressing the Dominion to act “responsibly,” to use its constitutional powers and, if need be, its financial resources to safeguard the capital of foreign bondholders and thus preserve its credit standing.
New York
In addressing himself to the problem of best protecting the integrity of the
& P P g Dominion’s and the nation’s credit, Towers drew a distinction between the default in Alberta and the situation in the other western provinces. Towers thought it “penny wise and pound foolish” not to preserve the Dominion’s and the country’s credit intact by meeting, on an ad hoc basis, calls from the other western provinces for loans to meet approaching principal and interest payments. This fundamental requirement to protect foreign bondholders’ Canadian investments was based on Towers’s reading on the bondholders’ & preoccupations:
The Alberta Default and Its Impact
Investors in that country (the United States) have bought western bonds right up to recent times on the general assumption that they were Canadian obligations, and therefore safe. Doubtless they should have exercised more discrimination, but not having done so, | am afraid that default will change their attitude toward all Canadian obligations from general faith to general distrust. They will fear—perhaps with a good deal of justification—that the default complex will move east. No one should attempt to lay down the law on a matter of this kind where the psychology of markets plays such an important part, but I have no hesitation in saying the situation I have outlined is the probable one. United States investors in Canadian western bonds constitute a very influential group, and if a general western default makes them form an adverse opinion on Canadian securities as a whole, the situation would be extremely serious and damaging for the Dominion.»
The Dominion was caught between the fears of foreign investors and the constitutional division of powers that gave Ottawa virtually no authority to police provincial government debtors. It seems reasonable to presume that the Loan Council concept” was a response to both domestic and international finance capital’s reluctance to buy provincial paper. Thus the solution proposed to ease bondholders’ anxieties was a new institutional framework under federal auspices to control provincial borrowing and thereby provincial credit-worthiness, which in turn would assist in protecting the Dominion’s credit standing.”
In an encounter between W.C. Clark and a New York investment banker, the connection, in the eyes of international finance capital, between Dominion and provincial credit was often raised. In December 1936, Clark drafted the following memorandum recording his discussion with Harry Morgan of Morgan Stanley.
[had a private discussion with Mr. Morgan in regard to the Western provincial situation, pointing out the fact that there was no legal connection between our credit and provincial credit (which he admitted, although stressing that there was a definite psychological connection which was of importance to the investor), and pointing out also how difficult it would be to make any statement which would not involve one in speculations that might prove untrue or that might not lead one to go on from a discussion of provincial credit to municipal credit, to almost anything under the sun.
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Later, when visiting Washington and New York in April 1939, prior to the sale of $20,000,000 in two-year notes, Towers sounded out Washington official Alvin Hansen and Canadian-born economics professor Jacob Viner and officials at Morgan Stanley on the effects of a possible Saskatchewan and City of Montreal defaults. Hansen and Viner were “unanimous that a combination of the two would be very bad.”®? This seemed to confirm the conventional wisdom within the federal bureaucracy that default must be contained in the interests of the Dominion’s foreign and domestic debt management operations.
In attempting to ensure that defaults would not spread east to other provinces, the Dominion Government provided considerable sums to Saskatchewan and Manitoba for relief and the maintenance of interest payments and continued to roll over Alberta's short-term obligations. Indeed, the tax rental scheme worked out during the early part of the war was designed to avoid an expected default by Manitoba in June 1941, the arbitrary reduction of interest by Saskatchewan which, when combined with the Alberta situation and municipal defaults, would have a decidedly negative impact on the Dominion’s credit at a time it required vast sums of cash.’ In Alberta's case, some aid was forthcoming but it was given sparingly. Alberta's requests made directly to the Central Bank were always spurned with the rider that advances would only follow a reconciliation with bondholders.'"
Alberta's Social Credit’s election, the April 1, 1936 default and debt moratoria legislation posed a serious threat to Canada’s financial system and, conse- quently, to the Dominion’s credit standing in the world’s capital markets. Both domestic and international finance capital quickly recognized this threat and the importance of isolating Alberta as aberrant debtor. The response taken was a measured one and largely directed by Canada’s brand new cen- tral bank that could make more objective judgments than chartered bankers whose profits were at stake. The careful management of the Alberta situa- tion by Governor Graham Towers was premised on the shared assumptions of maintaining calm in the capital markets. Calm in the capital markets was vitally important as the Dominion remained dependent on favourable mar- kets for selling Dominion securities.
BROADENING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE DEBT AND Bank RESISTANCE, 1935-1939
Dest MANAGEMENT AND THE CENTRAL BANK OF CANADA
The major objectives of debt management after the Bank was created were to take advantage of lower interest rates, to establish a broader and deeper mar- ket for government debt and to encourage a more finely tuned, impersonal set of market relations. This meant an end to private consultations with the banks preceding new Dominion issues. The achievement of these goals was a sine qua non for monetary policy based on open market operations requiring a highly sensitive, broad market in government debt, which was lacking at this time. The goal of broadening the market for government debt was designed to drive an effective wedge between the Dominion as prime bor- rower and the institutional purchasers of bonds. According to Governor Towers
...Our position versus the commercial banks and the security market is a very special one. For example, we can never obtain opinions from any outside source when we are formulating our advice to the Government regarding new issues. Thus we never enquire the views of anyone outside the bank. A central bank must be independent and impartial, which means that on most occasions it must play a lone hand.
This “lone hand” effectively meant the elimination of the previous consultations or negotiations with the chartered banks. Henceforward, the Bank’s policy initiatives and the Dominion’s borrowing costs would be based on the central bank's policies in response to Government's needs (as interpreted by Finance and implemented by the Bank) and the movements of domestic and international financial markets. International financial conditions had a significant effect on the ability of the Dominion to borrow at lower costs in international markets. Looser monetary conditions in London and New York also assisted the Dominion in lowering domestic rates. From August 1935, when long-term rates neared 4 percent, rates fell gradually to near 3 percent during the summer of 1939 before inching up prior to the declaration of War.
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Lower Interest Rates
During 1936, attention was directed towards funding the debt. In a memo, W.C. Clark outlined for Charles Dunning the variables to be taken into account when determining the term to maturity structure. These variables included the direction of interest rates and tailoring the term and rates to ensure investor receptivity.
If the objection to a 3 1/4% coupon rate is a real one with you, the alternative would be to try a 12 to 15 year issue, which we could do at slightly better than 3% if the [mJacurity were less than say 14 years and slightly above 3% if the maturity were 14 or 15 years. A 12 to 5 year maturity would probably be too long to attract bank buying in any volume and it would not give a rate of return that would be attractive to the insurance companies. To make sure of the success of the issue we could combine it with a shorter issue, say a six or seven year maturity, but che objection to this is that we probably should retain as many short term maturities for use a little later when we have to refund issues maturing in a period of higher interest rates. In other words, when the crend in interest rates turns upwards we will probably prefer to issue 3 to 7 year bonds rather than to tie ourselves up for say a 15 to 25 year period at the prevailing higher interest rates.”
The desirability of funding the debt at the prevailing low rates also preoccupied the Bank of Canada. In June of 1936, Towers speaking of the banks’ and life insurers’ lack of enthusiasm for long-term issues, noted:
We believe that their resistance is breaking down and that they would be ready to accept a longer term, say 30 years, for the sake of the additional yield. It is a moot question whether they will regard a 3.30 yield as attractive; but the Government cannot, and should not, offer anything better, and the prospects for success are, in our opinion, sufficiently good to make the attempt worthwhile.’
This assessment laid the groundwork for another Bank initiative led by Securities Advisor K.A. Henderson that resulted in the sale of $55,000,000 of perpetuals delivered in September 1936. In a “Very Secret and Confidential” (undated) memorandum authored by Clark, there was some doubt in the deputy’s mind as to the success of the proposed operation. Clark believed it would be safer co insert a hedge in the form of a 10-year, 2 percent bond, just
Broadening the Ownership of the Debt
in case the market did not accept the perpetuals. “While, I, myself, would feel more comfortable with such a hedge,” Clark advised his minister, “the Bank officials are confident that the perpetual will sell readily and that a hedge is unnecessary.” Clark had confidence in the judgement of the Bank’s officials and felt the initiative would meet the needs of “other financial institutions” (nonbank sector) and was consistent with “future plans for consolidation of our national debt.”* The Bank’s advice was taken and the $55 million in perpetuals were successfully marketed along with a $45 million medium-term issue.
The intermediary role played by the Bank as fiscal agent however put the central bank in a somewhat schizophrenic position between the capital markets, institutional investors and the Dominion. In 1937, this schizophrenia became evident during discussions between Finance Minister Dunning, Deputy Minister Clark and Governor Towers. Normally the central bank advanced proposals in the form of recommendations to the minister and his officials on the tranches and rates to be offered on new issues. That October, Towers recommended a 3.5 percent bond at par which Clark believed would be “construed as an admission and crystallization of a higher rate structure, and it was too early to take any such action.” In reply, the Governor believed this rate “during the present unsettlement in the markets could not be construed as a definite admission of permanently higher rates.” Several days later, Clark suggested that if the 3.25 percent rate proved to be a flop the Exchange Fund Account managed by the Bank might take up the residual. For Towers, this action would have had the effect of deceiving the market and “a great many people will say thar the Government had got into a fix by endeavouring to pare things down too fine.”* In Towers's view, it was essential that the loan be a complete success during this period of market uncertainty and a 3.25 percent rate “would not sell in sufficient volume to constitute a success.”
We had feared that no more than, say, $35 millions might be taken, instead of the $50/60 millions which was probably needed....certainly | hoped that would be the case. Our recom- mendation for the 3 1/2s was based on the feeling that they gave much greater certainty of success at a time when failure would be a bad thing, and they did not represent an unreasonable cost so far as the Government was concerned,’
What is revealing about this discussion was the Governor's strong desire to ensure a warm market reception for the bonds. This expectation, “the greater certainty of success,” is consistent with the expectation that emphasizes that
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market issues must be successful. “Failure” was not an option in these matters. Clark and Dunning meanwhile, from their institutional standpoint, feared a possible market reaction to a higher rate structure would be detrimental to future borrowing. This is not to say that the Governor and his officials were totally indifferent to the borrower's desires for a reasonable rate for borrowing. In a memorandum prepared in May 1936, the Governor wrote:
But what we are trying to recommend is a procedure which, in the end, will be the most satisfactory and the most economical to the Government. I feel that this point is extremely important because if any impression—even a subconscious one—grows up that we are casual in our attitude rowards costs or possible savings, there must necessarily be a tendency to discount any advice we may be able to give.*
The central bank then, in tendering advice to the Dominion on interest rates and terms, had to be both accurate in its appraisal of the market expectations and “appetite” and, at the same time, sensitive to the borrower's requirements for low rates.
Smatler Investors
With the creation of the Bank in 1935, a far more positive attitude was taken to the sale of government debt to smaller subscribers. The main impetus fora broader distribution of the debt came from the central bank’s Securities Department, which had close, daily contact with the securities market. Early in 1937, Assistant Deputy Governor Saint-Amour advised his superiors of the trials and cribulations of “the small investor (who) may put in his subscription a few times but if he is turned down on each occasion he will soon take it for granted that his money is not wanted, and will assume that Government bonds are monopolized by banks, insurance companies, etc.”*
In the Bank’s 1937 Annual Report, it was announced that to promote wider distribution of bonds the period elapsing between the offering and the opening of subscriptions was being extended. “This procedure gives small investors, particularly those who are distant from the large centres, a better chance of participating in a new issue,” the Report commented."
Behind the scenes, officials in the Securities Department promoted the idea of issuing bonds in smaller denominations. In February 1938, W.H. Budden reported a strong demand from small subscribers for a recent CNR issue. Budden counselled the Governor: “the availability of registered bonds in small denominations with the interest paid direct to the owner by cheque
Broadening the Ownership of the Debt
would not only provide an improved outlet for savings but would also have a salutary effect of developing a wider interest in and support for government securities.” The Securities Department followed this up by calling for the issue of bonds in denominations of $100, $500, and $1,000 in registered form “to facilitate a wider distribution of Dominion of Canada long term bonds” in response to a “progressively increasing demand.”
The foregoing can be better understood in the context of discussions taking place between the central bank and the investment dealers at this time in an attempt to improve the marketing and distribution of Dominion securities. This initiative to draw in a wider group of middle-class subscribers is also related to what was perceived to be a distortion in the bond market caused by certain classes of investors, including institutional investors, who had monopolized the ownership of tax exempt bonds."
RELATIONS WITH INVESTMENT DEALERS
In correspondence and meetings with Bank officials, members of the Investment Dealers Association consistently stressed the need for higher commissions “to stimulate sales” and to provide the organization for a wider distribution of bonds—the [atter, a policy espoused by the central bank." From the Government's perspective, commissions represented an off-the-top, one-time only, charge for placing the bonds. A high commission would be an inducement to sell as many bonds as possible but Towers saw that too large a commission might have marginally diminishing returns. When discussing the 1937 Refunding Loan of $100 million, Clark proposed an additional 0.25 percent underwriting commission on top of a 0.75 percent sales commission. Towers rejected this disguised commission, adding the extra commission “would not add greatly to the Dominions reputation for setiousness and plain dealing in matters of finance.”"
With respect to the issue of allotments, dealers were anxious to purchase a sufficient quantity of both bonds to meet clients’ demands and for inventory purposes, with which to turn a quick profit if the issue traded at an early premium, which was often the case. One of the first tasks of the new central bank was to devise a set of procedures for the marketing of public debt. The elimination of “padding” was a major concern of the Bank's. This practice saw “salesmen of larger houses...telephone to stock brokerage friends asking them to put in orders...such orders immediately assume that the loan is to be a big success and put in some orders of their own.”'* Often the names entered on the subscription lists were fictitious, a practice which was difficult, if not impossible, to detect. As Towers remarked in a letter to Charles Dunning,
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“padding takes on a ridiculous scale, with the result chat the more daring padders get a disproportionate amount of the bonds and the orderly marketing of the issue to investors is thereby prejudiced.”” Padding guaranteed that the padders would secure sufficient bonds to be able to meet customers’ demands and more, which enabled the firm to sell bonds into a rising after market to turn a quick profit on their own account. To prevent this practice, the Governor was prepared to sell bonds into a runaway after-market to curb this form of unhealthy speculation.®
The real impetus to change these speculative practices began in early 1938. In a memo prepared by the general manager of the Bank of Montreal, the pernicious effects of a “flood of subscriptions from small dealers for amounts which the inexperienced eye could identify at once as being far beyond the capacity of these bond houses to take care of” was sketched.’ As a result of this complaint, discussions were held with the Investment Dealers Association (IDA). The IDA pressed for the exclusion of non-IDA members, the creation of an “exempted list” for institutional investors with a commission to be pro-rated among IDA members, a 1.25 percent commission to IDA members and 0.5 percent to sub-agents.”°
The history of this pooled commission concept may be traced to Fry, Mills, Spence and Company proposal to the Dominion government in October 1930. Fry, Mills, Spence and their associates recommended the pooling of commissions for financial institutions (crust and insurance companies) when converting government stock. This suggestion for an exempt list of institutions would have eliminated dealer line-ups outside treasurers’ and investment officers’ offices seeking to arrange the proposed conversion.” This suggestion was again put forward this time by the IDA President, J.E. Savard in May 1936 to bank officials.”? The IDA desperately sought official recognition as the sole distributing group for Dominion issues along with the banks. The group also sought a type of controlled competition for its members through an exempt list that was eventually implemented during the War.
There were some in the Bank, including the Governor, who believed that stockbrokers, as opposed to investment dealers, should be removed from the list thus strengthening the role of the IDA.” However, in the minds of Bank officials and Dunning, the Association had to “clean up its act” before being granted this virtual monopoly. Dunning was apparently prepared to regulate against the abuses of the 1926-1929 period under the trade and com- merce clause if the dealers were unwilling to institute a satisfactory form of self-regulation.*
Broadening the Ownership of the Debt
Ultimately a decision was reached by which the Bank offered bonds “firm” to an approved list of distributors, including stockbrokers, with a 5 percent deposit required to discourage unnecessary and speculative padding. In addition, the Bank instituted a rule preventing the sale of bonds below issue price until the bank lifted the restriction. This restriction was usually lifted after the delivery of bonds. The dealers were eventually able to get around this trade restriction by “over-trading” or entering into swap arrangements with customers. This allowed the dealer ro sell the bond at issue price but in return the dealer received a bond that was priced below its market value.” It was also decided by the Dominion that firm allotments would be based primarily on the placing record of the various firms—past performance would determine future allotments.
The importance to a firm of allotments is reflected in correspondence between dealers and the Government concerning the Dominion’s domestic and foreign placements. In February 1936, Mr. Weldon of Midland Securities petitioned Clark to have his firm’s allotment increased. The deputy did acknowledge that he had called “attention to the fact chat the amount which it was proposed to allot to your firm did not, in my opinion, represent its placing power, and I suggested that the amount should be increased.”*6 Weldon in turn requested further assistance from Clark who replied that he had done all that he possibly could do to bring this to the attention of the authorities at che Bank of Canada.
Canadian dealers also hoped to use their “citizenship” to receive favoured treatment from lead underwriter, Morgan Stanley in U.S. transactions. In 1938, Clark received several petitions from R.W. Gouinlock of Bell, Gouinlock & Co. Ltd. and W. C. Pitfield of Pitfield and Company to have Morgan Stanley give a fair and sympathetic consideration to Canadian houses in general.” In reply to Gouinlock, Clark stated:
Frankly, I do not see that we can be the judge in these matters. Our bankers, Morgan Stanley & Co., are responsible for the success of any issues they underwrite and they must give us a guarantee of performance of their underwriting associates. We feel that we cannot insist on such a guarantee if we are to interfere in the selection of their associates *
Gouinlock, not entirely satisfied with this explanation, reiterated the expectation “that we have a right to ask our own Government, when they are arranging a loan of this character, to have us taken care of in the purchase group in view of our past record in the field of Government and Provincial financing.””
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Nationality however was not as important as pricing and placing of bonds in these matters. The deputy minister had to manage these applications diplomatically as advocating “jobs for the boys” would have a damaging effect on the Dominion’s all-important “reputation” on Wall Street. The Dominion, in pressing these special claims on the venerable investment bank, which was well paid for its work, advice and distribution capacity, would likely have found this special pleading to be counter-productive.”°
Dealers Relations with Banks
Competition from the banks in the bond distribution business was a long-standing complaint of the dealers. This conflict originates in the distinct nature of the two types of businesses. Dealers were responsible for distributing new debt and equity issues that had the practical effect of removing funds from the banking system and converting these moneys into instruments which could be freely traded in the secondary market. Banks were principals primarily concerned with yields and liquidity. Another dimension to the conflict was that the banks’ maturity preference was short term whereas the dealers were responsible for mobilizing funds over the long term in the form of debt or equity.
After the Conversion Loan of May 1931, the Investment Bankers Association of Canada (IBAC) approached the Canadian Bankers’ Association to inquire about press reports that banks promoted the distribution of these securities. The CBA did acknowledge that some bank managers may have been over-zealous taking business away from the dealers, yet the CBA claimed it was not in a position co bring the thousands of branch managers into line. The banks also maintained that they performed an essential role in distrib- uting securities to persons in remote areas where no brokers or dealers were situated.
The extent of this keen competition may be ascertained from the following letter written by an Ottawa-based dealer to che Bank’s Securities Advisor. “The worst and most destructive competitor we have,” wrote the dealer, “is the manager of the Ottawa office of the ‘B. of M.” which I think should be ‘ticked off.” The territorial rivalry also related to the financing of underwriting. In their “Brief No. 2—Banks Engaging in the Bond Business” presented to the Macmillan Royal Commission, the IBAC claimed:
The presence of banks in underwriting syndicates has on numerous occasions created situations where the security dealer is deprived of the confidential relationship which he shall have with the commercial bank which he does his banking. At the present time when bidding
Broadening the Ownership of the Debt
of negotiating for new issues dealers often find it impossible to consult with their bankers in order to arrange loan accommodation and foreign exchange coverage and other details because the bank is likely to be a member of an opposing syndicate and it is of course out of the question for the dealer to disclose his plans to a competitor.”
The investment dealers also called for legislation that would limit banks to the “receiving of subscriptions or receiving of instructions for the client.”* It was the general view of the dealers that it was in the public interest that the industry be protected lest the banks take over this retail brokerage function— a realiry which came to pass 50 years later.
CONSTRAINTS Limiting the Banks’ Influence
From March 1935 when the Bank of Canada was established, the chartered banks were excluded from the planning and preparation of bond issues. Meetings organized between the general managers of the banks and the governor and his officials (direct discussions with Clark and the minister were unusual) dealt with credit policy, international and domestic financial and political events, but never specifically on debt management.
Bank of Canada documents support the thesis that leverage exercised by the banks was founded upon their large holdings of maturing government paper. The creation of a central bank was seen as a partial wedge by which to give the Government more flexibility in refinancing. This could be done by eliminating negotiations and also via larger central bank holdings that would reduce the relative market holdings of the “Big Four” or “Big Five.” It remained a slow and arduous process to break institutional behaviours developed over half'a century or more of “negotiating” the terms of loans. In the cases to be discussed the banks’ holdings were viewed as a major obstacle in refinancing.*
In a memorandum dated February 4, 1936, K.A. Henderson, the head of the Securities Department, wrote:
Of the remaining items the most important are $45,000,000 Do- minion of Canada 1 and 1/2% bonds due t5th September 1936, $63,336,000 Dominion of Canada 2% bonds due 15th October 1936, and $79,535,200 Dominion of Canada 5% bonds due 15th November 1936. These maturities total roughly $188 millions and it can be taken for granted that possibly $150 to $160 millions are held by the chartered banks in Canada. The Government is, therefore,
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in the position of having to deal at maturity with the banks in a refunding arrangement which might be contemplated at that time. (The experience of last year in similar circumstances was not one which we would particularly like to have occur again.
That May, Governor Towers observed that:
...it would be necessary to have indications from the banks that the terms of the offering were such that they would convert the bonds held by them. While we should not assume that their views would be definitely unreasonable, they might differ from those of the Government by an amount which would not be sufficient to give grounds for a quarrel, but which might easily add to the Government's cost of financing by an amount of, say, 1/20th of 1%.... If the offering is made on a pure conversion basis, | am afraid that the results might be unsatisfactory. For one thing, as the banks hold a substantial majority of the maturing bonds, might they not expect that the Government would sound them out on terms before proposing a conversion; and would failure to do so set up resistance on their part?
A further example of the market power wielded by the banks is revealed in correspondence between the general manager of the Bank of Montreal, Jackson Dodds, and the minister of Finance, Charles Dunning. The corre- spondence shows the Bank of Montreal presented for conversion during the June 1936 loan $44,000,000 or almost one-third of the total conversion of- fer.
In the Fall of 1936, Dodds sought a return to the previous regime of distribution that favoured conversion holders over new subscribers. In explaining his bank's position, Dodds wrote:
It would seem likely that at some time within a reasonable period before the due date the holder will realize upon his maturing securities so long as a premium exists and in doing so if large holdings are involved the price level on short-term securities is bound to be affected to the disadvantage of the borrower.”
What Dodds apparently wanted was preferential treatment from the Government for the half dozen large holders of maturing debts who wished to be able to convert their holdings into the tranche chat most closely suited their needs and not the needs of the issuer. Dunning, in reply, stated that it
Broadening the Ownership of the Debt
would be unacceptable to allow holders two opportunities to convert their holdings. Instead the converters would be given preferential treatment bur only once.™ Dodds'’s prompt response highlighted the Montreal's vast market power, its preference for a short-term tranche, and the certainty of its conversion privileges.
It is perhaps worth noting that of the total conversion of $135,000,000 obtained by the Government in June the Bank of Montreal produced $44,000,000, that is, about one third. We fully realize that in converting $43,000,000 of our own bonds out of a total of $78,000,000 maturing we were running the chance that such issue as the Government would see fit to offer in the autumn loan, whatever the term might be, the principle of giving preference to the holders of maturing bonds would still govern.
While agreeing with the Dominion’s policy of funding, Dodds proposed that preference still be given to subscribers “who might indicate that they proposed paying for the new issue